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PART I
INTRODUCTION
The circumstances under which a court may exercise its "personal
jurisdiction" are dealt with so commonly in the procedural codes that
courts quite generally consider that power to be strictly limited by
statute. Unfortunately, however, both for the simplicity of the prob-
lem and for a fully developed rationale providing a pattern or frame-
work of rules assuring the "most efficient and just" administration of
justice possible, piece-meal and fragmentary legislation' broadening the
judicial power to exercise such jurisdiction has been the rule rather
than the exception.2 And closely related rules vitally bearing on effec-
tive judicial administration often do not appear in the codes at all.
Professor of Law, Montana State University.
1 Such legislation often contains a dual restriction on its scope, limited both by
subject matter and by the status of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev.
§ 33-411(c) (1958), limiting substitute service to a foreign corporation, in favor
of a local resident, on the enumerated causes.
2 Traditional professional conservatism has contributed at least substantially to
this slowness in broadening substituted service as is illustrated by Montana's experience.
See Syverud, "Substituted Service on Domiciliary by Notice Outside the State,"
2 Mont. L. Rev. 112 (1941). Twenty-two years ago, it was pointed out that the wording
of Montana's Code of Civil Procedure providing for substituted service (borrowed
from California shortly after Montana's statehood) was such that it could very
reasonably be interpreted as authorizing substituted service in every case where it
was constitutionally permissible. But if any practitioner in Montana ever argued
for that construction in a court, the issue was never taken to the supreme court.
Recently, some courts have adopted such a flexible rule for corporations. See, e.g.,
Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
3 Examples of these are dismissal on the ground of fraudulent or coercive service,
and dismissal for forum non conveniens.
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Recently, however, a number of "comprehensive codes" have been
enacted, attempting to deal generally and broadly with the subject,
and at the same time giving effect to International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington4 and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,5 the modern
United States Supreme Court decisions greatly enlarging the consti-
tutionally permissible grounds for exercising such jurisdiction. This
paper will consider what should be included in an "adequate" process
statute and how the current "comprehensive statutes" compare with
such an "ideal" statute. The study is divided into two parts: 1. An
examination of the present constitutional limitations on the exercise
of judicial jurisdiction; 2. A consideration of cognate matters which
are so closely related to the general question of when a court can or
should exercise jurisdiction that either they should be dealt with
directly in a single act, or at least should be carefully examined in the
context of such act. Part I, an analysis of the factors which appear
to determine the present limits of constitutionally permissible "judicial
jurisdiction" appears in this Symposium, and is devoted largely to an
interpretation of some of the less obvious criteria which the United
States Supreme Court has currently provided for measuring consti-
tutional limits. Part II critically examines related matters, raising the
question of whether they should or should not be included in a
completely articulated statute covering these procedures. It will be
published in another Review.6
Interest in effective legislation in this area has developed sufficiently
that, in 1962, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
a Uniform Act which includes our present subject.' Its provisions
regulating the vesting of judicial jurisdiction in a particular court over
a suit will be used as a model, and will be compared with three very
recent "comprehensive" codes enacted by Illinois,' Wisconsin9 and
Montana 0 respectively.
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
6 It will appear in 24 Mont. L. Rev. - (1963).
7 "Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act," approved at the Annual
Conference, July 30-August 4, 1962, and approved by the American Bar Association,
February 4, 1963.
8 I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
9 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05 (Supp. 1963).
10 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-2702-2(B) (Rule 4) (Supp. 1961). Laws of 1961,
Ch. 208, repealed much of Montana's existing Civil Procedure Code, enacting in its
stead, sections modelled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (with some modifi-
cations, of course). The expanded grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction were
incorporated from Federal Rule 4.
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UNiFoRM ACT
The Uniform Act includes several other topics in addition to "sub-
stituted service."" But our interest lies in Articles I and II, dealing
with that subject. Article I enumerates the various grounds on which
substituted service may be made, under the title "Bases of Personal
Jurisdiction Authorizing Service Outside the State."12 Article II deals
with the manner of such service and those qualifying to serve process.
The Uniform Act authorizes substituted service both generally and
specially. It subjects to personal jurisdiction generally any defendant
domiciled in or maintaining a principal business within the forum, 3
as do the Wisconsin 4 and the Illinois' 5 Codes. However, Montana's
new Code fails to authorize substituted service on the basis simply of
domiciliation, and there does not appear to be any other Code section
so authorizing. The Uniform Act, however, does not expressly author-
ize compulsive personal service within the forum state. Very possibly
this was omitted because the expressed scope of this Act is "interstate
and international." But it does contain a section expressly providing
that "a court may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis provided
by law."'" All three states, Wisconsin,' 7 Illinois'" and Montana,' 9
include an express provision for compulsive local personal service.
11 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, approved by National
Conference, Summer, 1962; by American Bar Association, February, 1963. In addition
to dealing extensively with several alternative methods for serving abroad, Arts. H,
III, IV, and V enlarge the variety of methods for securing testimony and other evidence
abroad; assures the fullest assistance possible to foreign tribunals and litigants; and
implements fully methods for the determination of foreign law, and the proving of
official foreign records. In popular current language, it maximizes "options" for
"getting the job done"--a remarkable advance over traditional restrictive approaches.
In short, it takes an "engineering" approach of authorizing and utilizing every means
possible to achieve the given "ends" sought in these areas. In so doing, it is drafted
to supplant the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act, the Uniform judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act, and the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act. See Commissioners' Prefatory
Note 3.
12 Art. I was added, almost as an afterthought, late in May 1962 after the remainder
of the Act had received official approvals. It replaces the Uniform Extra-Territorial
Process Act, then in its third draft, which had been discussed in the 1961 meeting of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In its section 3, that act had dealt very
narrowly and restrictively with "service of process" under the Act.
13 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.02.
'4 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(1) (Supp. 1963).
15 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 16(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
16 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, §§ 1.06, 6.01.
17 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(1) (Supp. 1963).
18 I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 13.1(2) (Smith-Hurd 1956).
19 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-2702-2 B(1) (Supp. 1961).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Although some of the various bases supporting "personal juris-
diction" by substituted service are stated more narrowly than in some
similar state statutes recently enacted, Section 1.03 (a) of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act may be cited as repre-
sentative of the current statutes broadening "personal jurisdiction
based upon conduct," departing from the strict rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff. It provides that:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a (cause of action) (claim for
relief) arising from the person's:
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct or
derives substantial revenues from goods consumed or
services rendered in this state;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in this state; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting.
Understandably, a "Uniform" act, drafted for maximum state
acceptance, refrains from adopting the more extreme statements of
rules authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
each subheading is taken from or is framed upon an existing piece
of state legislation. An editorial note states that Illinois provided the
model for clause "1"; Michigan for "2"; Maine, Minnesota, Vermont,
and Illinois for "3";20 and Wisconsin for "4." Clauses "5" and "6"
are found in several existing statutes. Clause "6" now also is fre-
quently found in substance in insurance regulatory codes. Though
drafted earlier, Montana's very recent Civil Procedure Revision adopts
clauses "1" and "2" in almost exactly the same form, though not in
the same order.
One provision found in at least two of the new "comprehensive"
process statutes, and included in the "Extra Territorial Process Act"
(merged in the present "interstate . . . Procedure Act") 2 is not
20 Actually, the Uniform Act often is stated much more broadly than the statu-
tory model cited. E.g., Minnesota's statute relied on, actually limits suits thereunder
to Minnesota resident plaintiffs against a foreign corporate defendant. Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 303.13 (1958).
21 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(8) (Supp. 1963); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-
27202 B(1)(f) (Supp. 1961); Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,
§ 2(6),
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included in the Uniform Act. It would subject any officer of a locally
incorporated corporation to substituted service in a local personal
action. The reason given for its omission in the Interstate Act is
that it so vitally affects the substantial rights of the stockholders that
it "is more appropriate to consider it in the context of the state's
policy on this issue as reflected in other statutes directly relating to
corporations. 2 2 This hardly is sufficient reason for excluding a pro-
vision on it in the Uniform Act. But more on this later.
SCOPE OF PROVISIONS
It now is reasonably clear that "transacting any business in this
state" is framed deliberately so as no longer to require the "doing
of business" in a continuous sense. The Uniform Act itself urges
this provision "be given the same expansive interpretation that was
intended by the draftsmen of the Illinois Act and has been given by
the courts of that state.12 3 Indeed a single business transaction au-
thorizes a local court to exercise personal jurisdiction by substituted
service. Thus, International Shoe, buttressed by McGee, is interpreted
as stating constitutional limits for all kinds of business transactions-
not just for insurance-or for collection of social security taxes.2
It must not be assumed that "contracting to supply services or
things" in clause "2" is simply a duplication of clause "l's" "trans-
acting any business" phrase. As worded, it authorizes substituted
service in an action brought on a wholly executory foreign contract.
Moreover, it clearly so authorizes in an action against a foreign
supplier for poor services or defective "things" delivered in the state
in many situations which clearly might not involve a "transaction"
within the state, as interpreted by some courts. In part, it serves as
a hedge against a possibly narrow construction of "transaction."2
So these two sections taken together intend to give the widest prac-
ticable scope to substituted service on actions arising out of commercial
activity having any substantial connection with the forum.
Clauses "3" and "4" both involve claims based on tortious con-
duct. In "3," only the causative act must occur in the forum, though
ordinarily the injury also will occur there. Though clause "4" reaches
22 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.03, Comment S.
23 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, & Commissioners' Prefatory
Note 6.
24 InI. Stat. Ann. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
25; Clauses (1) and (2) combined should do much to make even less plausible
such restrictive decisions as Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d
502 (4th Cir. 1956), denying jurisdiction because contact and shipment originated
outside of forum.
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outside the state to cover a foreign act causing injury in F similarly
to clause "2" in the commercial field, it authorizes substituted service
only provided the foreign defendant already has submitted to the
local jurisdiction by independent commercial activity. Though clause
"3" originally was drafted more conservatively to require that both
the tortious act and the injury occur in the forum, similar to a single
"business transaction" under clause "1," as approved, both clauses
"3" and "4" are almost identical in coverage with Wisconsin's cor-
responding sections.2" Montana's single clause dealing with tort inju-
ries limits substituted service to local tort injuries, but regardless of
where the act occurred and of whether the defendant has ever sub-
mitted himself otherwise to Montana regulation.27
Clause "5" appears in practically all of the "comprehensive"
statutes in substance, though Wisconsin's act extends its coverage to
include "tangible property" or "any asset" within the state. 28  Of
course it is not merely jurisdiction over the property asserted here,
but rather over personal actions arising out of such ownership, sup-
porting the exercise of personal jurisdiction by substituted service.
As mentioned, several states had ventured to subject foreign
insurers to substituted service on local claims before McGee, but all
of the broad acts drafted since that case apparently include a
provision such as is contained in the Uniform Act in clause "6."
RELATION TO "CHOICE OF LAW" QUESTION
It has been frequently asserted that the "law of personal juris-
diction" is closely related to the "choice of law problem."2 9 In a
26 Wis. Stat. Ann., § 262.05(3)(4) (Supp. 1963).
27 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann., § 93-2702-2 B(1)(b) (Supp. 1961). The fact that
several of the stated grounds for substituted service may be overlapping, applied to
certain facts, is intentional. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 11, at 6.
All this emphasizes an intention to exercise all the personal jurisdiction constitutionally
allowed concerning business activities of all kinds, particularly those in which the
forum has a substantial interest. Interestingly, this section in the Montana Code
formally asserts personal jurisdiction on the basis of any act, regardless of where
committed, if a tort action therefrom "accrues" within Montana.
28 Wis. Stat. Ann., § 262.05(6) (Supp. 1963). The jurisdiction asserted here
includes tangible personal property as well as land, and extends to such property
in the state either when the benefit first arose, or when the action is brought; hence,
this jurisdiction is very much broader than that found in other statutes under the
corresponding section.
29 Black, dissenting in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958): "True, the
question whether the law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different from
the question whether the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment,
but the two are often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar
considerations." Cf. Warren, id. at 253. Ehrenzweig, "The Transient Rule of Personal
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recent article, Professor Leflar suggests that, for constitutional pur-
poses at least, the United States Supreme Court may be in the process
of "merging" the two. He asks: "Are the limits which the federal
due process clause sets on state exercise of judicial jurisdiction
gradually coming to be identical with the limits which the same clause
sets on state exercise of so-called 'legislative jurisdiction' . . . ?))30 He
accepts the phrase "fair play and substantial justice" used in
International Shoe as providing the "key" to when substituted service
is permitted, and submits that it will be satisfied when: 1. The claim
involves local elements making it reasonable for plaintiff to prefer local
suit; 2. The defendant is the volitional cause of local presence suf-
ficiently to subject him reasonably to local suit; 3. No relevant public
interest is disserved by allowing the local suit.8 '
This is a meaningful question, and Leflar's interpretation of
"fair play and substantial justice" may seem equally meaningful.
But both contain latent ambiguities which must be clarified and re-
solved before they can bear fruitful solutions.
Part of the ambiguity is resolved in a footnote32 explaining that
the suggested "merger" deals exclusively "with jurisdiction based
on the fact that the cause of action sued on is itself somehow connected
with the state where the suit is brought." But there remains the
question of whether Leflar intends to suggest that "judicial jurisdic-
tion" is being expanded constitutionally to become identical with the
existing constitutional limitations on "legislative jurisdiction" exem-
plified in the Dick3 case generally, or, on the other hand intends to
say that the broadening of constitutional power limiting "personal
jurisdiction" should be equally available to broaden "legislative juris-
diction." The language of the principal quotation, above, strongly
suggests the former, but Leflar uses illustrations strongly suggesting
the latter. For example, he urges34 that the "place of contracting"
rule constitutionally imposed in Delta & Pine Land Company, 5 should
Jurisdiction: The 'Power' Myth and Forum Conveniens," 65 Yale L.J. 289, 291 (1956):
1... [A]n example may serve here to illustrate the close though often neglected con-
nection between the laws of jurisdiction and of choice-of-law."
30 Leflar, "The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers," 9 J. Pub. L.
282 (1960).
31 Id. at 285-6. Note that, in stating "governmental interest" negatively in
number 3, Leflar stresses, or at least encourages the stressing of, the trial aspects of
the case-the adjudicative institutional interests of the forum rather than any legis-
lative interest.
32 Id. at 282-3, n.2.
.33 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
34 Leflar, supra note 30, at 284.
35 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
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now give way to a more flexible rule. This would broaden very
considerably traditional "legislative jurisdiction" rather than using the
latter to measure "judicial jurisdiction." On the other hand, his sug-
gestion that any person owing a debt, but not being sure to which of
several persons it was due, should be permitted to interplead non-
residents at the debtor's domicil (apparently even though the opposing
parties have no contact with that domicil)36 seems to go beyond
current constitutional limitations on both legislative and judicial
jurisdiction.
But this is not all. Leflar uses additional illustrations contributing
further to this ambiguity. He cites divorce, criminal jurisdiction, and
workmen's compensation, 7 traditionally strictly localized actions, as
being highly relevant to his thesis. Apparently, he finds strong evidence
in these strictly localized actions of the same "merger" of judicial-
legislative jurisdictional limits as he sees in the broadening of the
constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Having
described these localized actions, he queries further: "Are the outer
boundary lines which the Constitution sets for these two kinds of
jurisdiction tending to converge in other case areas also?"' 38 The noted
illustrations, with the above query, poses the question of whether
Leflar intends to say merely that, in any case in which a court
exercises its personal jurisdiction under McGee, it will be permissible
for it to apply its own law as a matter of course.3 9 Or is he saying that
he sees a localizing process going on generally throughout the conflicts
field?40
Possibly, what Leflar's suggestion comes to simply is that, in
the future, the United States Supreme Court may be expected to apply
36 Leflar, supra note 30, at 286-7.
37 Id. at 282.
38 Ibid.
39 Credibility is given this interpretation of Leflar by the fact that he cites
Currie, "Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws," 8 Duke L.J. 171,
178 (1959), and Ehrenzweig, "The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,"
58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960), both apparently influenced much by Nussbaum, Principles
of Private International Law 37-9, 94 (1943), wherein he champions what he calls
the "homeward trend," raising a strong presumption in favor of "choosing" the
forum's own law. Such view is valid-applied to these particular bases for substituted
service, precisely because the forum exercises jurisdiction to vindicate its substantive
interest, therein. For that very reason, they offer no general support for the "homeward
trend" in conflicts. Cf. Briggs, "The Need for the 'Legislative Jurisdictional Principle'
in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws," 39 Minn. L. Rev. 517, 541-5 (1955).
40 The validity of such interpretation of current developments is doubtful. How-
ever, an analysis based upon the principle of "institutional affiliation," implemented
through a genuinely policy-oriented law, may require more "localizing" of actions
than exists in current practice. See Briggs, supra note 39.
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a single standard of "fair play and substantial justice" to limit both
"legislative jurisdiction" and "personal jurisdiction"--i.e., where-
ever there is one, there is the other. So stated, however, it is very
reminiscent of standards suggested forty years ago by Lorenzen,41
Cavers, 42 and to an extent, Cook,43 and currently vigorously espoused
by Dean Graveson 44 of the University of London. But such proposition
gets not one step beyond the bare statement of an ideal requiring
creative legal administration. It was barren of results forty years
ago,45 and there is no more reason to expect it to bear fruit today,
extended to "judicial jurisdiction."
This much is certain, however. The very fact that this enlarged
personal jurisdiction is limited strictly to litigation arising out of a
"purposeful contact" by the defendant with the forum, respecting
which the forum must have at least some "governmental interest,"
requires the conclusion that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
these special cases is regarded as reasonable precisely because of a
substantial "governmental interest," inhering in the forum which it
wants to implement and vindicate. Hence, as others have said,46 "The
'law of personal jurisdiction' is closely related to the 'choice of law
problem'," particularly in this area. From this, it is clear that the "gov-
ernmental interest" that is significant and that is served by determining
what "choice of law" should be made refers to the subject matter of the
litigation rather than merely, or in addition to, its procedural interest
in a "fair trial" or in relative "trial convenience. 4 7 Hence, thus
clarified and limited, substance may be given to Leflar's question when
it is used to ask the following two additional questions about legislation
enlarging personal jurisdictions:
41 Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale L.J.
736, 743 (1924).
42 Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problems," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173,
179, 193 (1933).
43 To Cook, the real "touchstone" was not "justice" as such formally, but
rather "social convenience," though the former is an element in the latter. See, e.g.,
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 253 (1942). Similarly,
"justice" will be a significant ingredient in an "institutionalized" approach, though
generally only one of many factors, and generally "derived" from the particular
"subject matter" involved in its institutionalized setting.
44 Graveson, The Conflict of Laws 6-7 (1952).
45 A summary supporting this assertion is found in Briggs, supra note 39, at
526-9.
46 See authorities cited note 29 supra.
47 In his analysis of the many cases involving the point, Towe finds that "govern-
mental interest" as a requirement for substituted service, beyond its strictly procedural
interest, has become so attenuated as to be almost nonexistent in several cases. Towe,
"Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4B," 24 Mont.
L. Rev. 1, 15 nn.89, 90 (1962).
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1. How generally has this legislation utilized the full limits of con-
stitutional powers recognized by the United States Supreme
Court today for purposes of "legislative jurisdiction" to measure
the scope of "personal jurisdiction by substituted service"?
2. How much, if any, of this legislation authorizing substituted
service has been framed so as to require the conclusion that F
intends not only to enlarge its court's "personal jurisdiction,"
but also intends to create new "substantive rights" by apply-
ing its own law in situations where traditionally no such right
would exist-i.e., in the past, its courts have applied a foreign
law?
As to the first question, so long as one's attention is focused on
the extent to which these acts enlarge the grounds for substituted
service, thus modifying Pennoyer v. Neff,4 the development in this
law seems to be "radical," even extreme. Just as soon, however, as
one accepts the premise that substituted service may be permissible,
either generally because of some enduring legal relationship or
"affiliation" of the defendant with the forum, or specially, because in
the particular action he is found reasonably to have submitted to that
law and to have expected its protection, it becomes clear that all of
these acts to date are most conservative in their handling of the
subject. Indeed, a careful reading of each of these varying grounds
for substituted service quickly makes, clear that they are carefully
framed so as to limit substituted service not only to acts of trans-
actions in which the forum has a very substantial governmental
interest sufficient fully to warrant it to apply its own law as controlling,
but that in most of the situations traditional conflicts doctrine would
require that its law be applied.
This is true generally of clauses "I "3," "4" and "5" in the
Uniform Act above.49 Although clause "3" makes jurisdiction turn on
a local negligent act rather than local injury, in most cases the injury
also will occur in the forum. Moreover, the common law, as defined by
the Restatement, recognizes such an "act" as a permissible basis on
which to exercise "legislative jurisdiction" by awarding "damages"
for any injury, local or foreign,50 and there is some developed current
48 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
49 See text accompanying notes 11-28 supra.
50 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 64-65 (1934). The latter section states: "If
consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state, each state .. .may
exercise legislative jurisdiction. . . ." Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws
§ 43f(1) (e), comment h (1958), generally confirm. See also Briggs, "Utility of the
Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws," 6 Vand. L. Rev.
667, 686-7 (1953), and comment thereon in Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 821-2
(2d ed. 1954).
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practice selecting that law as governing."' It is particularly interesting
to note that under clause "4," although the tort would be governed by
the forum's law under the orthodox "place of the tort," the defendant
is subjected to substituted service only in those cases in which he is
already subject on the basis of "doing some 52 business" there generally,
i.e., where he has identified himself and is "affiliated" with the
forum's economic institutions on independent grounds.
That clauses "2" and "6" also deal with situations which are
governed by the local "substantive" law is supported by the very
considerable volume of common-law authority adopting the rule that
the "place of performance" governs both the validity of the contract
and the performance thereof. 53 Further, the fact that the domicil of
the person or the situs of the thing insured has made repeated efforts
to assert its controlling interest in these insurance contracts is highly
significant. That "insurance contracts" came to be subject to a more
restricted choice of law rule, requiring that the law of the "place
of contracting" govern the essential validity of such contracts regard-
less of the "subject matter's" location, resulted from an unduly narrow
construction of the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme CourtY4 But both of these sections contain a common prin-
51 The choice of law provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act, as construed by
a very recent unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court, dramatically
illustrates this practice. In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), the Court
construed the phrase "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred" (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)), to mean that the whole law where the negligent act
occurred, regardless of the location of the injury, should be "chosen." Of course this
includes that state's "choice of law rule," traditionally supposed to pose the terrible
"renvoi" problem. But the Court stated this analysis will provide a desirable "flexibility,"
taking into account recent modifying developments in tort choice of law. Id. at 11-13.
It also supported completely the thesis that the "whole" law of a state with exclusive
legislative jurisdiction should be included in a reference to it; that there is no difficulty,
logical or otherwise, in such practice; and that it is not only desirable, but absolutely
necessary, in a policy-centered law. Briggs, supra note 50, at 667-673, 697-700;
Briggs, supra note 39, at 517-21.
52 Courts upholding this jurisdiction are likelyto recite the fact that the defendant
maintains some business connections with the forum, having no connection with the
suit, though it need not amount to "doing business." Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton
Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior
Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958). Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, Editorial Comment 7.
53 Classical support for the "place of performance" rule are found in Hall v.
Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891), and Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882), basing
it on "presumed intention of the parties." Story gave credence to the rule in Story,
Conflict of Laws § 280 (1834). See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1077-9 (1935). Cf. Com-
ment, 2 Mont. L. Rev. 74 (1941).
54 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918).
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ciple of great importance. They both recognize that the "subject mat-
ter" of the contract, whether it be to supply services or "things" or
insurance coverage, is the vital element which should be utilized for
allocating and measuring governmental interest, rather than the formal
contract in these highly important types of transactions. Though
technically, in these statutes, this is only for the purpose of authorizing
the exercise of "personal jurisdiction" on substituted service, the
underlying principle involved here goes a long way in supporting a
view advanced by the writer some years ago, that, to determine what
law should govern the substantive rights of the parties:
Should not the "subject matter" of the contract determine the
"choice of law," rather than the highly formalized and concep-
tualized doctrines of contract law as such? Are not those doctrines,
involving highly conceptualized abstractions altogether too insub-
stantial to support the highly developed conflicts doctrine expounded
by the Restatement-or by the "local law school" for that matter?
[...T]he "de facto" subject matter, and the fact that it is almost
as varied as life itself-at least economic life-has seemed to give
no one concern. Few were inclined even to ask the question whether
the essential nature of the policy considerations involved might not
be greatly affected and might not vary greatly for conflicts purposes
according to the variety of that subject matter-for the purpose of
determining that some one society and law has a controlling legis-
lative interest in the contract. Of course, it may be insisted that
every transaction becoming a contract includes certain "distinctive"
de facto elements, occurring so regularly in all contracts as to pro-
vide an independent, substantial generalized subject matter for all
contracts. These are the series of acts expressing the "will," and
implying a "meeting of the minds." But these are precisely the
"subject matters" and this is the field most dramatically dem-
onstrating the unsatisfactory character of the "mechanical appli-
cation" of conflict doctrine. The series of acts involved may occur
in "n" number of states, having no "social" significance or relevancy
whatever to the states in which they occur, their locus being purely
accidental. So, there is especially good reason to ask why the
"realists" did not seize upon this field to demonstrate the need for
a "sociological" analysis of conflicts. . . . Cook particularly . . .
might have been expected to point out the need for a reappraisal
of conflicts doctrine, applied particularly to contracts, to give full
effect to the interests of that society most substantially affected
by the transaction. . . . Yet, when he examines the contracts field
as a basic for criticizing the Restatement's formulation of governing
law, he simply advances the "intent of the parties" rule as one
preferable to the "place of contract" or to the "performance"
rules.55
55 Quoted from an as yet unpublished "Project Outline," entitled "General Theory
for 'Conflicts' Based in a Genuine 'Sociology of Law'," Ch. XX, Contracts 48-51 (1958).
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On the above analysis56 it seems reasonable to conclude that,
although Leflar's suggestion (that "due process" controls over judicial
jurisdiction and over substantive jurisdiction are "moving toward
each other, tending toward identity in their dividing lines between the
permissible and the not-permissible") is supported at least super-
ficially by recent developments, it has little present practical value
in evaluating the actual current law. Moreover, though it seems likely
that Hartford Accident & Indemnity Corporation v. Delta & Pine
Land Company5" would be reversed if it were decided today by the
United States Supreme Court as he suggests, his further conclusion
that "fair play and substantial justice" will support a demand by a
debtor that his foreign claimants be subjected to the personal juris-
diction of the debtor's forum by interpleading them there to determine
the rightful claimant,5" not only does not meet Leflar's own second
criterion for measuring "fair play and substantial justice";5" it is not
supported by any Supreme Court decision to date. Those claimants
ordinarily would have done absolutely nothing to "submit" themselves
to the jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, of that state, unless he
intends to limit it to a forum having contacts with both claimants. The
debtor chooses his own domicil and forum which is assumed to have no
interest whatever in the substantive claim itself.
Leflar's conclusion on this interpleader action may result from the
giving of too much weight to an emerging factor which he feels is the
key in the recent enlargement of substituted service-that plaintiffs
have as much justifiable interest in having their claims adjudicated at
convenient places as do defendants. (Of course, courts generally always
have found a duty to entertain suit by a resident. Most of these cases
involve resident plaintiffs.) So long as the Supreme Court continues
56 If "substituted service" and "choice of law" controlling actions on insurance
policies should be determined by the interests protected (i.e., the subject matter),
measured by "institutional affiliation," the above statement should help us recognize
a serious question arising under the most common form of the statute permitting
substituted service on insurance contracts. The Wisconsin statute bases its jurisdiction
either on the domiciliation of the insured when the action arises, or alternately, when
the event insured against occurs in Wisconsin. In the other three, including the
Uniform Act (as well as in California's Insurance Code, the forum's interest supporting
substitute service is determined as "of the time of the contracting." Without detailing
the reasons here, obviously, Wisconsin's statute more realistically protects the "institu-
tional" interests of a state than does the provision found in the other statutes, though
all three bases for exercising "personal jurisdiction," stated alternately, may be sup-
portable.
57 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
58 Leflar, supra note 30, at 287.
59 Id. at 285-6.
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to require the forum to have a substantial governmental interest in
the transaction involved submitted to it by the defendant's own
"purposeful act," this factor will be secondary. Moreover, on the
second question in particular, with the possible exception of the
insurance field, there is little evidence that the enlarging of substituted
service is related in any way to any attempts to "enlarge" or vary
traditional substantive rights.
Another current intensive study of the law's development under
these substitute service statutes suggests the following criteria for
determining whether a defendant can be so subjected to personal
jurisdiction: 1. Some local governmental interest (high, manifest,
slight); 2. Trial convenience; 3. Purposeful act of the defendant
establishing significant contacts with the forum and expecting benefits
and protection from its laws with respect thereto.60
Without doubt the Supreme Court repeatedly stresses these
three factors in its recent leading decisions expanding personal juris-
diction.61 Though there may be room for a difference of opinion as
60 Towe, supra note 47, at 13-21. Towe notes the similarity between his "criteria"
and those given by the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 84 and comments
(1956). Id. at 21-2 n.140. The latter, however, are stated much more generally than
are Towe's. Cf. Note, "Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations. Based on a
Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe," 47 Geo. L.J. 342 (1958). Its criteria,
(1) a cause of action, based on (2) a single act by a foreign corporation (3) in a "fair"
forum, have very limited usefulness in determining the criteria which must be imple-
mented in a comprehensive "personal jurisdiction" statute. It greatly overstresses "act";
it merely paraphrases the statutes' strict limiting to a special jurisdiction; and it buries
all the specific concrete problems in the phrases "fair play" and "substantial justice."
61 Towe's three-fold test succinctly summarizes the specific bases justifying such
jurisdiction stated in McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-4 (1957):
1. Purposeful act: "The contract was delivered in California. . . ." 2. Governmental
interest: "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. .. ."
3. Trial convenience: "These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they
were forced to follow the insurance company. . . . When claims were small or
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action
in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof. . . ." On
the third criterion, its principal difference from forum non conveniens is that it has
become part of constitutional doctrine-a characteristic of due process. Towe notes
that this was "deemphasized" in Denckla but maintains, correctly it seems, that "it
is difficult to exclude trial convenience from the minimum contacts test." Towe, supra
note 47, at 16. In effect Justice Warren said that "trial convenience" standing practically
alone is not enough. See particularly, "Developments in the Law-State-Court Juris-
diction," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 1011-12 (1960). It suggests that "public interest factors"
in forum non conveniens are not important in due process. But public interest may be
served and implemented through "due process--especially where that interest relates
to "personal rights"; also, greater "inconvenience" may be constitutionally permissible
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to whether one of these "factors" is of primary importance with the
other two subordinate, whether all three are equally important, or
whether the relative importance varies from case to case,62 that the
Supreme Court considers each of these three relevant seems un-
questionable. In any case Mr. Towe's analysis is a very helpful one in
understanding the actual decisions to date. However, any analysis
emphasizing "single act or transaction" as the central factor, out of
context and without regard to the "institutional affiliation '6 3 of the
subject matter of that act or of its possible relation to strong govern-
mental interests located in other states, omits certain vital factors
which, though not present in some cases, actually are decisive in
others-our thesis for "Part I."
Perhaps the thesis stated here can best be illustrated by consider-
ing the real issues which separate the dissents from the majority
opinion in Hanson v. Denckla.0 4 It is believed this will establish that
major error by competent judges results from assuming that, because
the defendant performs "similar acts" in the forum in both, McGee
should govern Denckla-this, in spite of the fact that in McGee65 the
cause of action supposedly involved simply the enforcement of
than a forum non conveniens standard; and, relative convenience to the plaintiff is
of greater importance than under traditional forum non conveniens doctrine.
62 Towe, supra note 47, at 21.
03 In the phrase "institutional affiliation," the word affiliation intends to suggest
a close, intimate contact and relationship between a state and the "subject matter"
of (i.e., the exact issues in) a cause of action, of a more or less enduring character.
Institutional stresses the dynamic character of that subject matter-the social, economic
and political interests that are tied up in and served by that "subject matter." It also
intends to stress the profound importance of dealing with the "subject matter" as an
integrated unit. The phrase describes the "key concept" for analyzing conflicts problems
generally in terms of a "genuine sociology of law." It includes all that congeries of
"intangibles," including rules and regulation and "norms" for its inner order which
often go to make up institutional frameworks and processes.
Incidentally, Sunderland used the phrase "affiliating circumstances" to describe
the relation of a defendant to a court necessary to support "personal jurisdiction";
justice Warren used it to describe that relation supporting all forms of judicial juris-
diction, personal and in rem. As used here, "institutional affiliation" supports the
exercise of every possible form of jurisdiction, legislative and judicial. A better
example could hardly be imagined than the "trust business" and the specific trusts
involved in Denckla. Compare Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction, Selected Essays
on Constitutional Law 1270, 1272 with Chief Justice Warren in Hanson v. Denckla,
supra note 29, at 246.
64 Hanson v. Dencka, supra note 29, at 257-263.
GG McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., supra note 61. Of course the forum's interest
actually was far more substantial than merely as locus of the "transaction," because the
"subject matter" of that contract was "sitused" there, making California comparable to
Delaware, rather than to Florida, in Denckla.
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contract rights "arising" in California, the forum, while in Denckla,
admittedly the prime "subject matter" of the litigation was "sitused"
elsewhere. The following analysis is based on a thesis which, when
applied to trusts, requires the conclusion that in any case in which a
trust is as closely connected to a particular state as was this one to
Delaware, that state must be recognized to have as exclusive a juris-
diction thereover as over Delaware land. So, in the following analysis,
in an effort to suggest the real grounds for that position and to avoid
past unfortunate criticism of the use of the concept of "situs"60
applied to this subject matter, the phrase "institutional affiliation" as
defined above in note 63 generally will be substituted for "situs."
INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
Historical Background
On this analysis, obviously, the "dominant factor" in this case
is the fact that all of its issues relate to a "trust," both the corpus of
which, and its administration, are "affiliated" exclusively with Dela-
ware and subject exclusively to its laws. All parties assumed that all
trust assets were "sitused"67 in Delaware. The trustees, both in their
corporate capacity generally and as the administrators of these
particular trusts, were subjected exclusively to Delaware law with
respect to the discharge of their trust duties. How, then, can there
be any question as to what law should determine the legal consequence
of the exercise of the power of appointment by Mrs. Donner? A brief
historical summary of the problem will suggest that question's
answer.
66 Various writers have been caustic in recent years in their criticism of the
common judicial practice of describing an "intangible" as if it had a "situs"--treating
it as a tangible for this purpose. But the time spent in such criticism could have been
devoted much more profitably to an inquiry as to what are the factors in such cases,
psychologic and institutional, which influence courts to treat such intangibles in this
way. It is believed that the conceptual tool, "institutional affiliation," can help to
make that kind of inquiry fruitful.
67 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 29, at 247. The trust "res" was composed of
corporate securities, equally susceptible of being characterized either as "tangible"
or "intangible." Justice Warren says that "such assets are intangibles that have no
'physical' location. But their embodiment in documents . . . makes them partake
of the nature of tangibles." Id. at 247, n.16. These terms explain exactly nothing
as to why they are considered located in Delaware. On other issues, they equally readily
may be deemed "sitused" at the corporate domicil of each issuer. The real reason
is that they form the "nexus" of the trust institution affiliated exclusively with the
state of Delaware, out of which all the present legal issues arise. So, as in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), whether deemed "tangibles"
or "intangibles"-it matters not one jot nor one tittle.
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One of the first and most pressing problems facing the new
federation of states following the Revolution came from determined
efforts by some states to intrude into the territories of other states for
the purpose of nullifying or limiting the sovereign interests of those
states over residents or subject matters found there. Sometimes
state F11 would assert a power to subject a citizen of state S to the
personal jurisdiction of F's courts with the object of subjecting him
to a strict personal liability for the full amount sued on simply on the
strength of his ownership of some kind of property in F-often on
suits entirely foreign to that ownership."9 At other times we have
found, and still find, courts attempting to expand their "jurisdiction
over the subject matter" greatly, simply by virtue of an admitted
personal jurisdiction over some or all of the parties involved, at times
buttressed by a determined attempt to extend an admitted jurisdiction
-such as Florida's "probate" jurisdiction in Denckla-thus proposing
to intrude into the exclusive jurisdiction over subject matters of all
kinds located exclusively in another state, which, on the basis of
reasonable, workable and practical principles of "institutional affilia-
tion" governing the proper allocation and distribution of powers among
the states should readily be recognized as subject exclusively to the
laws of that state.70
08 The symbol "F" describes the state first asserting judicial jurisdiction. "S"
refers here to the state "impinged" upon. It will become "F-2" when "F-i's" judgment
is put in issue there.
609 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. 1796), seems to be a prime example of
this outrageous tendency. In a Massachusetts action, the return recited that the
deputy has "attached a handerchief" of the defendant, and caused to be left a summons
at his residence in Connecticut-this to support a personal judgment for a large sum.
In a subsequent action thereon in Connecticut, the defendant felt obliged to deny any
attachment of any of his property. Though very much aware of its full faith and
credit obligations, the Connecticut court declared that this judgment was entitled to
no credit whatever. The outrageous situation resulting from this kind of practice
is demonstrated in the current judicial practice in Germany. See deVries and Lowenfeld,
"Jurisdiction in Personal Actions--A Comparison of Civil Law Views," 44 Iowa L.
Rev. 306, 332-44 (1959).
70 In Briggs, supra note 50, at 679-80, and in Selected Readings on Conflict of
Laws 198 (1956), the author recognizes and discusses the critical importance that
the forum not assert a subject matter jurisdiction it does not have, in the name of an
admitted jurisdiction. Hence, the following by Leflar, supra note 30, at 286, is very
disturbing:
So-called in rem jurisdiction over intangibles such as choses in action, statuses,
and heirships in probate has always been more difficult to understand [than
intangibles], but it becomes easier to understand once we break away from the
false notion that the intangible somehow acquires a physical situs, as a tangible
thing does, which supports the exercise of jurisdiction over it, and instead
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That the first practice, asserting an unlimited personal juris-
diction over a defendant simply by seizing something allegedly be-
longing to him, attempts to extend raw power to an area where it does
not exist at all and is so arbitrary that it cannot be tolerated by other
states, has had to be reasserted at regular intervals ever since the
Revolution.7' The other half of this insidious practice received a
degree of respectability by the English decision of Penn v. Lord
Baltimore.7' There may have been a special justification for that
court's determination of legal interests in foreign land in that case.
Certainly the English court thought so, relying on the assumption
that the land lay where there was little developed government or
civilization. Further, the issues were between British subjects, both
of whom were equally subject to the jurisdiction of the Crown and
its instrumentalities, and the territories involved generally were
governed by the same laws. Though none of those very sensible con-
siderations have existed in subsequent cases, the decision has been
cited time and again as justifying a court of equity, in the exercise
of its admitted personal jurisdiction over the parties, to adjudicate
interests in foreign land. The gross error of this has been recognized
only recently, though in critical decisions the instincts of the United
States Supreme Court always have been sound, rejecting the argument
that a nonsitus court has any power to adjudicate interests in foreign
land, either directly or indirectly.
Nevertheless, the ambiguous character of the "subject matter"
over which the court has jurisdiction in an equity suit has continued
to beguile and mislead-for some intriguing reason-students of the
subject more often than the courts. 78 Further, the error involved in the
say that the standard of fair play and substantial justice must be satisfied ....
This recognizes that a defendant's interests in intangibles are personal interests
not appreciably different in kind, but only in their factual aspects, from
personal interests enforced in proceedings classified as in personam, and
properly identifies the true question in both types of proceedings as one of
whether it is fair and just . . . for the defendant's interests to be adjudicated
by a court of the forum which the plaintiff has chosen.
Not only does this statement close the door to understanding either Warren's opinion
or the justification for it; to judge the validity of an analysis based on "institutional
affiliation," he takes the "key" and throws it away.
71 Careful examination of our history establishes that Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878), was simply a flowering culmination of that struggle, producing rules
congenial to stable interstate relationships.
72 1 Ves. Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750).
78 Those writers generally, who rely on "justice" as the touchstone for selecting
the applicable law, naturally find a very broad-ranging jurisdiction in equity to
render binding decrees. Briggs, supra note 39, at 526-29, summarizes these views,
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assertion of such power by a foreign court, in actions raising directly
and immediately questions of ownership in foreign land, shows up all
too often in probate proceedings-the claim to competency here
being asserted in the name of the domicil's admitted competence to
receive for filing and probate a will of its domiciliaries, as the locus
of the "primary administration of the estate." Substantially the same
question arose in Clarke v. Clarke4 as is involved in the Denckla
case. There, the South Carolina court was faced with the question of
whether a certain provision in a will being probated there as the
testator's domicil effected an equitable conversion of land in Con-
necticut. The answer to this question would, in turn, also answer the
question of who should take the property. The South Carolina court
ruled that the real estate was equitably converted into personalty and
directed that it should pass under the will as personal estate rather
than as realty.7 In categorical language, the United States Supreme
Court upheld Connecticut's refusal to give any effect to South
Carolina's ruling and order, stressing the complete lack of jurisdiction
of the "subject matter," i.e., who should inherit foreign land under
the will.76
In a modern English case the basic issue was even closer to
Denckla. In In re Duke of Wellington,77 the English probate court
was faced with the problem of construing and administering two wills
executed by the Sixth Duke of Wellington: one covered his large
estate in Spain, including much personal property; the other devised
his English estate, concluding with a residuary clause. The Spanish
will failed completely for want of an heir qualifying under its terms.
So the question the English court had to decide was whether the
Spanish estate should pass intestate or by devise under the English
will's residuary clause.78 Immediately it recognized that it must look
to Spanish law to determine how Spanish land would devolve under
these circumstances 79 (though it erroneously assumed that it could
apply English law to determine who should take the Spanish personal
property) . 0
noting their shortcomings. Cf. Currie, "Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees,"
21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 620 (1954).
74 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
75 Clarke v. Clarke, 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202 (1896).
76 Clarke v. Clarke, supra note 74, at 191-192.
77 In re Duke of Wellington, [1947] 1 Ch. 506, aff'd, [1948] 1 Ch. 118 (1947).
78 Ibid.
79 Id. at 514.
SO Id. at 513. Cf. Falconbridge, op. cit. supra note 50, at 192, pointing out that
the only court with jurisdiction to adjudicate an estate is the situs.
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Analysis of Denckla
Justice Warren recognizes and reaffirms, in principle, the doctrine
both of Clarke v. Clarke and Duke of Wellington, recognizing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the situs of land. Indeed, he extends their
doctrine so as clearly to impose the same limitations on tangible
assets of all kinds, when he says that
Authority over the probate and construction of its domicili-
ary's will, under which the assets might pass, was thought [by
Florida] sufficient to confer the requisite jurisdiction. But juris-
diction cannot be predicated upon the contingent role of this
Florida will. Whatever the efficacy of a so-called "in rem" juris-
diction over assets admittedly passing under a local will, a State
acquires no in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of inter
vivos dispositions simply because its decision might augment an
estate passing under a will probated in its courts. If such a basis of
jurisdiction were sustained, probate courts would enjoy nationwide
service of process to adjudicate interests in property with which
neither the State nor the decedent could claim any affiliation....
For the purpose of jurisdiction in rem the maxim that personalty
has its situs at the domicile of its owner is a fiction of limited
utility. . . . [It] is not a sufficient affiliation with the property
upon which to base jurisdiction in rem. (Emphasis added.) 8 '
This goes "double" for property bound up and institutionalized in a
foreign trust. This forthright recognition of the limits on the compe-
tence of nonsitus courts over tangible property of all kinds is highly
significant, though it is quite in line with current developments. It
relies on basic propositions that the writer has advocated for many
years,82 which propositions are implemented in great detail in the
current tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws. 3 For these reasons, the long-range importance of Denckla
81 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247-9 (1958).
82 See the following studies: Excerpts From "Utility for Solving the 'Renvoi',"
Selected Readings on Conflict of Laws 189 (1956); Briggs, supra note 39; Briggs,
"'Renvoi' in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis,"
64 Yale L.J. 195 (1954); Briggs, supra note 50; Briggs, "The Jurisdictional-Choice-of-
Law Relation in Conflicts Rules," 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1948); Briggs, "The Dual
Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in the Succession Field," 15 Miss. L.J.
77 (1943).
83 The analysis developed in the articles cited note 82 supra, based on a recognition
of an exclusive legislative power in one state, requiring that any reference to that
law include its "whole" law, is fully articulated in Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws, Ch. 7, Property (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). This analysis extends to .l
interests, both legal and equitable, and to all forms of tangible property. The Intro-
ductory Notes, pages 12-14 and 78-82, detail this rationale. And §§ 293a through 299d
apply the same rationale to trust interests-of the greatest significance in evaluating
Denckla.
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very well may be contained in the above quotation, rather than in the
supposed limitations which it puts on International Shoe and McGee.
The fact is that the manner in which the question is raised of
whether Florida could render a judgment entitled to full faith and
credit in Delaware, or one even valid in Florida, simply by subjecting
the Delaware trustees to foreign notice, actually raises a spurious
issue. If it be established that Florida had no in rem jurisdiction of
any kind, what can any form of service on the trustees add to its
competence-even compulsive service? Neither the parties nor the
court can vest it with a jurisdiction it basically lacks. The Florida
rule on "whether the trustee is an indispensable party" cannot even
become relevant until it is first vested with a subject matter making
that rule relevant; its rule thereon, regulating Florida trusts, just has
no bearing on this case. If that rule provided that personal notice or
mailed notice to the trustee wherever he might be found was sufficient
notice, it would be perfectly valid for a local trust and very probably
was so framed. Perhaps the Florida court itself recognized this fact;
that, by its own conflicts rule, in some way it has to make Florida the
state of the trust's creation. That may well have been its primary
reason for torturing the import of the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment by calling it a "republication of the original trust instrument in
Florida.184 But the institutional affiliation of the trust assets and its
administration cannot be so relocated by any such simple twist of the
wrist, any more than could land be moved. Whatever instruments,
written agreements, contracts, wills or other documents relating to
the trust may be executed, and wherever executed, they must be
subordinated to Delaware's law, not that of any other law-not even
that of the settlor's domicil-in the same way that the validity of
contracts to convey land must be controlled by its situs 5
Undoubtedly, Florida has a "substantial interest" by virtue of its
being the court of primary jurisdiction and administration. And the
84 Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1956).
85 These conclusions are implicit in §§ 293a through 299d, of the Restatement
(Second). The Restatement (Second) also makes exactly the same distinction between
that law governing the effect of the contract on interests in the land itself, and that
governing rights measured by "purely contractual matters," as was made in, Briggs,
"The Jurisdictional-Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules," 61 Harv. L. Rev.
1165, 1183-4 (1948). See Restatement (Second), Introductory Notes, 14: "Suppose
that a contract to convey land in state X is entered into in state Y. Here X law, as
that of the situs, governs the effect . . . of the contract upon actual interests in
the land. . . . On the other hand, the law governing the contract determines what
might be called purely contractual matters. . . ." The same generalization may be
made concerning instruments relating to interests in a trust, such as in Denckla.
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subject matter over which it has "jurisdiction" as such court is sub-
stantial. Nevertheless, as is often the case, the critical issue in this
case is precisely that of what is the scope of the Florida court's
"jurisdiction" to apply its own substantive rules in disregard of all
other laws, in the name of its probate jurisdiction. Florida assumes
that its "laws" govern all issues arising, e.g., "is the trustee an indis-
pensable party?" 6 Scott apparently is willing to grant that its probate
jurisdiction vests it with a competence to bind "personally" all persons
subject to its "personal jurisdiction" on all such issues.17 Similarly,
Warren grants that this probate jurisdiction might justify it to "apply
its own law" so as to bind the persons made parties to the suit, but
insists that it cannot bind the whole world-even though he is fully
aware of the barrenness of the concept of "unitary administration of
the estate.1
8
If these conclusions are sound, Justice Warren might have made
the real issues in the case clearer had he pointed out that a Florida
decision on whether the trustee was an indispensable party was
irrelevant to the case-that it did not lie within Florida's legislative
jurisdiction even to frame a rule on that for this particular case;
hence its judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction over the issue of
ownership in the trust estates8 9 Instead, the majority formally grants
for purposes of argument that Florida's rule on whether the trustee is
an indispensable party may control the entire case; that, since
Florida law clearly treats the trustee as an indispensable party in
all adjudications of trust rights by it, and since this trustee has not
88 Actually, Justices Warren and Black differed in Denckla, as to whether the
Florida rule had been clearly established on this point. Compare Warren, supra note 81,
at 255-6, with Black, id. at 261-2.
87 Scott, "Comment: Hanson v. Denckla," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 695, 708 (1959).
88 Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 81, at 254. Even attempts to erase the distinction
between "rights in rem" and "rights in personam," by calling all interests in this case
"intangibles," as does Douglas, or "personal rights," as does Leflar, ignores completely
the basic institutional realities of the case. An English decision, In re Lorillard, [1922]
2 Ch. 638, starkly reveals the fatuousness of the idea that the domiciliary court has
any kind of "jurisdiction" over the estate as a whole, where found in several
countries. It ruled that the ancillary court in England properly exercised its dis-
cretion in refusing to remit a considerable balance after local debts to the principal
administrator in New York for payment of creditors there who were barred by the
English statute of limitations, and paying the balance instead to the English heirs.
See also, Dicey, Conflict of Laws 936-38 (Keith 4th ed. 1927), discussing the importance
of this case.
89 This is the real answer to Black's insistence that the case be remanded to the
Florida court for its determination on the issue of "indispensability." Hanson v.
Denckla, supra note 81, at 261-2.
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"submitted" to Florida law by any "purposeful act," Florida cannot
acquire personal jurisdiction over him; hence its decree is void. 0
As suggested above, it is believed that this rationale unnecessarily
introduces a specious issue, providing a spurious basis for placing
Denckla in the line of decisions articulating and limiting International
Shoe and McGee."
This is not to say that Denckla does not state an important
limitation on the "doing of an act" basis for asserting and exercising
"personal jurisdiction." Quite to the contrary! Its conclusion that it
must be a "purposeful act by the defendant himself" to so subject,
and that therefore, T, a third person (Mrs. Donner) could not, by
moving around from state to state, subject a defendant in a passive
relation to T to the power of each state to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over him, is a desirable limitation on the acquiring of jurisdiction
by the doing of an act, as a general proposition. It expresses a reason-
able limitation, generally consistent with our ideas of what is "fair
and reasonable," and probably is institutionally desirable.92 However,
its real relevance, even for this case, is open to question. Possibly,
the Chief Justice chose to find lack of "personal jurisdiction" in
order to avoid a decision on whether Florida could choose to apply
its own law to the "trust instrument" on the "republication" gambit. 3
However, some language in the case also suggests that the
Florida judgment may work as an estoppel against those subject to
personal jurisdiction. Again, it is very doubtful that the case is an
appropriate one for imposing an "estoppel," even on broadened
grounds of "res judicata." Such a rule, practically, would vest the
Florida court with a jurisdiction to transfer title to foreign tangible94
assets in violation and in derogation of the law of their "situs." The
want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, and no one
90 Id. at 251-2, 255.
oi 1 . ....... e . t D ii _ D',kla in line w ith M cGee correctly, but on
289 U.S. 253 (1933), as interpreted by
rs Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934),
fits of recognized legislative jurisdiction
tct" requirement of "purposeful act" to
uch the same standard of reasonableness
ion, legislative and judicial, of a foreign
e permitted for "choice-of-law" purposes,
jurisdiction. Hanson v. Denckla, supra
tracterization of "tangible" or "intangible"
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should be estopped to challenge it in Delaware." If there is a
complete lack of jurisdiction in the Florida court over the trust res
and its administration in Delaware as an incident of its probating,
construing and administering this will, that fact should be obvious
on the face of any resulting judgment; certainly, no parties subjected
to the proceedings against their will should be estopped to rely on
that voidness in Delaware."'
A modern leading Supreme Court decision, cited by Justice
Warren, and dealing with this general question, declares that a
probate decree of the domiciliary court does not have binding effect
on outside personalty "of nonresidents over whom there was no
personal jurisdiction. 9 7 And, though it may be interpreted as standing
for the rule that persons subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
court are so bound, it does not say that, (only ruling that those not
subject are not bound) and no such rule was called for by the case.
Indeed, the logic of that case, in which the primary question in issue
was "where was the deceased's domicil," would require the conclusion
that the only state which can make a binding rule on that issue to
govern administration of and succession to chattels is the situs of the
chattels-and that inconsistent findings thereon by all other courts
are void on their face and may be collaterally attacked at the situs
by any interested person.98
Practical Justification for Exclusive Jurisdiction
But the above conclusions are based on the premise that the
"situs" of the property has such a controlling interest in its disposition
that it always should have a competence to make its own independent
findings-and to refuse, on petition of any interested party, to give any
effect to the judgment of foreign courts thereon, as it sees fit to. Is
such premise justified?
95 Florida made no pretense even, of trying to apply Delaware law; it assumed
it was the governing law by the republication. Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 84,
at 382.
96 The conclusiveness of a judgment by "estoppel," because subject to the court's
personal jurisdiction, generally is based on a voluntary submission. Hence, any pro-
posal to extent it to these cases of pure "statutory submission," or even voluntary
submission, concerning the court's probate jurisdiction, should be questioned.
97 Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941); Hanson v. Denckla, supra
note 81, at 249.
98 In Riley, the estate in issue was Coca-Cola stock. Opposing counsel stipulated
that the stock should be deemed "sitused" in Delaware, the state of incorporation of
the issuer. Delaware was the last state to rule on the location of the testator's
domicil. Had it ruled first, surely all other states would be bound thereby. See,
Briggs, supra note 85, at 1169, n.11.
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It may be recalled that the first several areas in which the
Supreme Court approved the "statutory subjection of nonresidents to
substituted service" quite generally were explained as being excep-
tional situations calling for the exercise of the special police powers
of the state. (Of course, some courts try to so limit McGee even
today.) But it is now generally agreed that this newly developed
constitutional power exists "generally" on quite a broad basis-no
"special" police power is necessary. But does this accurately describe
what has occurred? Does it not more realistically describe the actual
factors influencing this development by recognizing the fact that new
legislation enlarging substituted service is based on the proposition
that the state has a very substantial governmental interest which it
is likely to want to assert with respect to practically every socio-
economic institution centered in that state? If this is so, should not
that state's paramount interest where it is clear, and particularly with
respect to those institutional affiliations over which it has an exclusive
concern, always be available on behalf of any interested person, even
though this limits principles of res judicata-subject only to an
adjudication in which that state itself has so participated as to bind
it? This state interest may thus be given effect by allowing individuals
to assert it on due process grounds. This is not new. It always has
been recognized that it is a lack of due process for any court to
assert power over a subject matter over which it has no jurisdiction.
It may be time to reassess recent tendencies to enlarge uncritically
res judicata so as to bar further inquiry into jurisdiction. 9
The above assessments of the present law indicate that current
trends generally are giving increasing recognition of and effect to the
governmental interests of each state; that, as to acts and/or con-
sequences which occur within a state, personal jurisdiction by sub-
99 Although the principle of res judicata has been extended so as to bar a
second adjudication of jurisdiction over some subject matters, it has never been
enlarged so as to bar all such adjudications. A finding of jurisdiction to determine
interests in foreign land never becomes conclusive. It was expressly excepted in Stoll
v. Gotlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). Moreover, it appears that any gross or obvious
assumption of subject matter jurisdiction does not raise a collateral estoppel. Kalb
v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), appears to maintain that rule. Duke v. Durfee,
308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), most trenchantly affirms this principle. Accord, Restate-
ment, Judgments § 10 (1942); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 451(2) (1948). More-
over, Duke very strongly supports the thesis that the state's interest in such issues
properly may be protected by allowing the private parties to continue litigating the
issues in a second court, as we suggest. Id. at 220. See Boskey and Braucher, "Juris-
diction and Collateral Attack: October Term, 1939," 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1006 (1940),
naming numerous "subject matter" jurisdictions, an adjudication on which does not
become res judicata.
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stituted service may be based thereon so long as they are not
incidental and subordinate to institutional affiliations of superior
importance, subject exclusively to other state(s); but that various
important socio-economic-political institutions characteristically are so
affiliated exclusively with some one state that acts, transactions and/or
conduct of various kinds, though occurring abroad, must be drawn to
that legal system generally governing those institutions-to be gov-
erned, of course, exclusively by that law. These conclusions raise a
serious question whether such "act" properly supports a personal
jurisdiction by substitute service. The very least required here is that
the forum do the best job it can in applying the "affiliated" law-or
alternately, that it dismiss the suit on the issues governed by the
foreign law.
This is not to say that the fact that the institution has some
casual, incidental or subordinate connection with another state should
never be given any effect. But whether it should must be determined
by that controlling law.100 To use the Denckla case for illustration,
Delaware has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation and adminis-
tration and proprietary interests in such trusts as are involved in that
case. However, if there is a substantial argument for the view that the
law of the settlor's and testator's domicil at death should be taken into
account, it should be left to the situs of the trust to make a decision
on that issue.
Conflict Avoidance
Moreover, the broad ranging concept of "conflict avoidance" by
planning cumulatively supports these conclusions. Thus, the practical
argument that the law should be so stated that a settlor could plan his
trust estate with certainty as to what law will govern, points unerringly
to Delaware in this case, i.e., the state where it was established and
left permanently to be administered. The facts strongly suggest that
Donner may have left the trust in Delaware because she knew that
her exercise of the appointment would be given effect there. Her
wishes, on the other hand, would be completely defeated if Florida
were allowed to render a binding adjudication thereon. Of course, a
trust situs might very reasonably apply either its own law or that of
the domicil at death, whichever would best give effect to the wishes of
100 See Briggs, "Utility of the jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered
Conflict of Laws," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 667, 668-674, 697-700. (1953); Briggs, "Renvoi
in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis," 64 Yale L.J.
195, 214-218 (1954).
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the testator-if the situs has a strong policy favoring such a rule-
but again, the domicil itself is in no position to so determine? 1
Trusts-Testate or Inter Vivos
The above discussion of the principle that the state with which a
trust estate is most closely affiliated institutionally must be held to
have the sole jurisdiction to determine rights therein, makes no
distinction between trusts created by will and those created inter
vivos because it is submitted that that principle must govern both
types. However, the reasons for such a rule regulating an inter vivos
trust are even more compelling. So far as appears from the record,
not only was the original trust created inter vivos and administered
many years as such, but the power of appointment also should be
found to have taken effect immediately, if any effect is given to the
obvious wishes and intentions of the settlor. She exercised the ap-
pointment by a written instrument in the form of a "deed," carefully
and consciously executed separately from the will she executed the
same day. Presumably, that part of the trust res affected by the
appointment also was formally transferred immediately to the two
trustees originally selected by the daughter (mother of the new
beneficiaries). If she continued to receive all income for life, the
inter vivos appointment and transfer are no less effective.
02
Critique of Dissents
If this is correct, then Justice Douglas' assertion that Florida has
competence here because the "appointment was integrated with the
will" just is not correct, and his concession that "one not a party or
privy to the Florida proceedings" can separately litigate the right to
assets in other states draws the line between the correlative powers
of the various states at the wrong place-as does Justice Black. In
any case, full recognition of the plenary power of the state of
101 Ironically, in this particular case, the domicil is determined to defeat the
effort of the testator, contrary to strongly expressed modern doctrine that that law
giving effect to the testator's wishes should be chosen-at least so long as it has any
substantial connection with the issues. Cf. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws
§ 295 (1958); Recent Decision, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 694 (1927), noting Miller v.
Douglas, 192 Wis. 486, 213 NAV. 320 (1927), which selects the law of the situs directly
to govern trusts of personal property generally, including testamentary disposition.
It observes that the domicil generally governs, but grants that this is at the direction
of the situs.
102 It is most helpful if the legal effect of these transfers be determined at the
time they occur; so the law governing at that time must also be clear. The only
acceptable law for that purpose is the state of affiliation. The settlor's domicil may
change many times before her death.
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paramount institutional affiliation, under a rule that all subordinate,
collateral acts and transactions, whether local or foreign, are drawn
to that same state, tremendously simplifies the entire "choice of law"
problem, making it clear that the legislative power of differing
states will not vary according to incidental, casual or minor variations
in those transactions. Certainly, it is of the utmost importance to be
able to determine at once, at the moment of the exercise of the power
in many such cases, what law governs; the same law should govern
for all purposes as a matter of course. The contact of these subordinate
transactions and acts with other states often is accidental, without
legal significance, and never with supervening significance.
In interpreting other cases to determine which one should be
deemed to control the present decisions and which ones not, serious
error results from a failure to give effect to the above analysis. This
is dramatically demonstrated by the positions taken by both Justices
Douglas and Black in Denckla. For example, Justice Black takes the
position that "the decision most nearly in point [with Denckla] is
Mullane' . . . ." Apparently, he concludes that because New York,
the situs of a "common trust fund" subject to extensive state regula-
tions and controlling exclusively the scope of the trustees' powers and
duties, was allowed to adjudicate the liability of the trustees simply
by giving notice to all persons known to have any interest therein by
that means most likely to give them notice in fact, Florida must likewise
be allowed to exercise the jurisdiction asserted here. From another
perspective, it seems almost incredible that any such comparison
should be made. In Mullane, New York was the state with exclusive
power (i.e., the "situs" on the basis of sole institutional affiliation)
over the trust and everything drawn to it. Here, it is clear that Jackson
intended to say that New York had exclusive jurisdiction to render a
final adjudication on the issue of the trustee's liability, without any
"personal jurisdiction" over the beneficiaries at all.'0 4 In this respect,
103 Black, dissenting in Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 81, at 260. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. supra note 67.
104 Actually, the proceeding was a statutory accounting by the trustees. Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra note 67, at 309. The fact that the
"common trust fund" is both strictly a creature of statute, subject to the most rigid
and detailed administrative regulations, and a resourceful institutional device or tool
for the most economical and expeditious administration of small trust accounts, is
quickly revealed by a perusal of New York's law authorizing them, N.Y. Banking
Law §§ 4, 1O0c, which includes sixteen detailed regulatory paragraphs, which, for the
common trust fund, must be added to many other more general regulations.
Sections 8-16 deal with proceedings for determining the fidelity of the trustee and
the safety of such investments. They include the requirement that the trustee
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New York was exercising the traditional "in rem" or "quasi-in-rem"' 0 5
jurisdiction-though even here, due process imposes an enlarged
duty to give notice in fact if possible. 0 6 In Denckla, in contrast,
Florida had no such power at all. Delaware's jurisdiction, not Florida's,
parallels or is analogous to New York's in Mullane.' 7
Similarly, Douglas cites Atkinson v. Superior Courtl0 as a con-
trolling precedent for Denckla.109 Apparently, he, too, fails completely
to recognize the parallelism in institutional affiliation between Califor-
nia in that case and Delaware in Denckla, not between California and
Florida as he supposes. Instead, he concludes that simply because the
California court found that it had such jurisdiction over the subject
matter involved that it could render a binding decision on the issues
raised without "personal service" on the named New York trustee,
Florida had equal "jurisdiction" without "personal service" on the
Delaware trustees. Such conclusion flies squarely in the face of the
fundamentally different character in the governmental interests that
periodically file an accounting of its common trust funds and petition for a "settle-
ment of its accounts." This was the proceeding involved in Mullane.
The case is pregnant with meaning in that it dramatizes the fact that the process
of institutionalizing more and more of our activities rushes on apace; that such
institutions are a compound of non-legal "norms for the inner order," of strictly
legal norms, and of human elements-all coordinated and integrated so as to achieve
determinate ends; that the dynamics of such institutions spring from the motivations,
will, desires and resourcefulness of the members manipulating such institution within
its established framework of norms-legal and non-legal; and that, as society consciously
and deliberately institutionalizes such activities, very commonly such institutionalizing
will be identified with some particular socio-political unit supplying the legal norms
and determining what pattern of norms will best serve the purposes for which the
institution is created. Jackson sensed that what is considered "reasonable" should
be determined in considerable part by the needs and capabilities of the institution-he
measured the notice requirements accordingly.
105 Black is not correct in saying, as he does in Denckla, supra note 81, at 260,
that in Mullane the court rendered a "personal judgment" in favor of the trustees against
the nonresident beneficiaries without local service. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243
(1912), in which the Supreme Court recognized a power in the Minnesota court to
impose a statutory assessment on foreign stockholders in a local corporation, enforceable
at their domicils without "personal jurisdiction," is analogous. The court called it
in the nature of a quasi-in-rem proceeding.
106 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946), rules that though a court has personal
jurisdiction of the defendant, it must continue to use that form of notice most likely
to inform him in fact, of any further proceedings in the case. Accord, McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
107 Black just assumes that the Florida court in Denckla stands in exactly the
same relationship to the primary subject matter as does the New York court in Mullane.
108 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
109 Douglas, dissenting in Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 81, at 263-4.
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California and Florida had in each case. In Atkinson, the suits arose
out of collective bargaining agreements entered into between California
employers and California unions, vitally affecting permanent em-
ployment relationships "sitused" in California, and involving economic
interests (source of the wealth involved) just as permanently sitused
there. Every "institutional" element was "affiliated" with California.1 0
So far as appears from the case, California made no attempt to
exercise any control whatever over any kind of foreign property;
neither does it appear that any rights, powers or duties had as yet
"accrued" or matured in the foreign trustee. This suit seeks simply
to forestall that, by. asking for effective forms of relief available wholly
to plaintiffs in California. Here, the "trustee" is indeed a "nominal
party""' in the most literal sense, in contrast to the very active
trustees, vested with all trust powers and duties, in Denckla. So, with
personal jurisdiction over all the other parties involved (including
particularly the Federation), California was in the best possible
position to decide whether the plaintiff employees were being unlaw-
fully deprived of a part of their wages by their union, in violation of
fiduciary duties in their favor; 1 12 also, whether the agreement that
"royalty payments" should be made to the foreign trustee was illegal
and void; and whether the Federation should be liable in damages for
such breach of duty. 3
110 The plaintiffs complained that, in violation of its duty as their collective
bargaining agent, and in fraud of their rights, the Federation (union) contracted with
the employers that certain royalty payments and payments for reuse of motion
pictures on television should be paid to a trustee for specified trust purposes instead
of to the employees. The court had to decide whether the defendant New York trustee
was subject to substituted service under a state statute so providing where the action
"relates to . . . personal property in this State, in which . . . defendant . . . claims
. . . an interest . . . [and] the relief demanded consists in excluding such person
from any interest therein." The case is complicated unnecessarily by much argument
based on the supposed strictly "floating" character of the trustee's chose-in-action.
But, though the court shows a prejudice against the term "situs," for intangibles, it
accurately describes the principle of "institutional affiliation" in ruling that "the
multiple contacts with this state fully sustain the jurisdiction of the superior court to
exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the intangibles in question." Atkinson v.
Superior Court, supra note 108, at 966.
111 Contrasted with Florida in Denckla, here California has a plenary power to
decide whether the trustee should be deemed an "indispensable party."
112 This fact may be stressed again. The supposed distinctions either between
"in rem-in personam" or "tangible-intangible" are completely irrelevant in this kind
of fact situation. See authority cited note 110 supra.
113 One hardly could ask for a fact situation more dramatically demonstrating the
error of Professor Leflar's conclusion that "a defendant's interests in tangibles 'wherever
located' are personal interests not appreciably different . . . from personal interests
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Circuit Court Error
Still another very recent case dramatizing the error that results
from a failure to recognize the importance of the distinguishing factors
we have been discussing is a 1959 court of appeals decision 114 in
which the court interprets Denckla as clearly limiting McGee "to the
insurance field." Apparently, the Seventh Circuit felt sure that, except
for the fact that Denckla involved interests in trust estates, while
McGee involved rights arising out of an insurance contract, these
two cases were on "all-fours" with each other; that means that so
far as the acts performed in the forum in each case were concerned,
they were nearly enough identical to require the same governing rule
regulating the exercise of personal jurisdiction in each case, and that
the difference in results must be because Denckla states the "general
rule," and McGee permits substituted service as an exception only
because the insurance field is subject to "special police power regula-
tion.""' But this is erroneous. As is said elsewhere, "The McGee
opinion is based upon the minimum contacts theory of jurisdiction and
not upon the special nature of the business."" 6 But further, this con-
struction of McGee indicates a failure to realize how much more
substantial was California's interest in the subject matter of that
contract than was Florida's in the trust interests considered in Denckla.
In McGee, not only did certain affirmative acts relating to the "trans-
action" occur in California, but the subject matter of the insurance,
with all the interests implied therein, also was exclusively "affiliated"
enforced in proceedings classified as 'in personam' . . ." and that, therefore, any
court should have equal competence to adjudicate suits involving such interests, based
simply on the personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Leflar, "The Converging Limits
of State Jurisdictional Powers," 9 J. Pub. L. 282 (1960). And Douglas goes even
further in Denckla when he attempts to justify Florida's exercise of jurisdiction over
the Delaware trust by maintaining that "Florida has such a plain and compelling
relation to these out-of-state intangibles . . . as to give Florida the right to make the
controlling determination, even without personal service over the trustee. . . . It is
merely a suit to determine interests in those intangibles." (Emphasis added.) Douglas,
dissenting in Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 81, at 263. Agreed that it matters not
whether the interests are classified as "in rem" or "in personam," both Leflar and
Douglas ignore completely the fact that so-called "intangibles" or "personal rights"
may be as closely affiliated with a single state, institutionally and functionally, as is land.
114 Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
115 On this analysis, the special police power recognized in Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927), and similar cases, simply is extended to include the insurance
field; hence, no change in traditional doctrine.
116 In lI. Ann. Stat. Ch. 110, §§ 17 (Smith-Hurd 1962 Supp. 16), Jenner and
Tone differ with Tripp, declaring that, "The McGee opinion is based upon the minimum
contacts theory of jurisdiction and not upon the special nature of the insurance business.
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with California. In contrast, the essential "subject matter" of the
litigation in Denckla was affiliated exclusively with Delaware."'
Validity of Institutional Treatment
Thus far, our discussion simply has asserted the reasonableness
of giving the trust estate an exclusive "situs" in Delaware, and of re-
quiring that all matters involving and affecting the "substance" of
that trust be drawn to and assimilated by that law-i.e., that the
"fnorms governing the inner order 1 1 8 of a trust, operating as an
economic-legal institution, must constitute a single body of regulating
and governing rules internally consistent and harmonious. Whatever
may be the practical limits of such a proposition applied to trust
institutions which have been so divided and spread over several states
as to make it difficult to establish a single "base" or locus for it, to re-
peat, it is submitted that, institutionally, there is quite as much reason
for giving the trusts here involved as single and exclusive a "situs" in
Delaware as has Delaware land.
Contrary to various critics of the idea of ascribing "situs" to an
intangible, again, institutionally, that term sometimes is the most apt
traditional concept to describe the results of the institutional consid-
erations involved on issues requiring an adjudication of legal interests
therein.'19 With no other established terminology to describe fixed
relationships justifying the choice of a particular law exclusively, the
courts have had to utilize what appears to them to be the most sug-
gestive terminology available. If the critics 20 had searched realistically
for the "practical and operational" reasons supporting the use of that
117 This does not intend to ignore or negate the difference in the purposefulness
of the contacts by the defendants with the forums in the two cases.
118 Institutionally, this phrase is useful to describe that body or pattern of rules,
regulations and procedures that make the institution "tick," assuring both its self-
contained integrity and the appropriateness of its functions and activities in relation
to its purposes in society. The phrase, "norms for the inner order," is suggested by
Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 121-36 (Moll's translation,
Russell & Russell 1962). The institutional analysis found herein, and used to resolve
conflicts questions, builds on a rationale elaborated by Ehrlich, being consistent with
this writer's conception of the law's relation to its society. This phrase is a relative
concept. "Norms" constituting the "inner order of society" as a unit will be external
to those regulating particular, individual institutions.
119 So, surely there could be no objection to using the term to describe the
"result" both in Denckla and in Atkinson.
120 It long has been the vogue to speak disparagingly of "situs" applied to
intangibles. We find ample evidence of this criticism in Leflar's comments, supra note
70, as well as in the remarks of some of the court in Denckla and in Atkinson, though it
led to no harmful results in the latter.
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term, their researches would have been far more fruitful than have
been the criticisms of this use of "situs." So, in expropriation cases,
in applying a rule that the "situs" of property "expropriated by
government decree" determines the validity of that decree, English
courts have consistently treated institutional debtors, domiciled in
England, as "sitused" there. The "institutional affiliation" with
England of the Bank of England, with headquarters in London, or of
a London trading firm engaged extensively in international trade, at
least for many issues, is quite as obvious as if it were land that was
involved. So the former King of Spain's bank deposits in London,''
and an Austrian merchant's credit balances with a London trading
company,122 were not subject to the expropriation decrees of the
domiciliary states. It is hoped that the phrase "institutional affiliation"
will make clear the baselessness of the charge that the use of "situs"
to describe the controlling "contact" in these cases is a misleading
fiction.12
3
The extent to which trust supervision and administration has
become a major economic institution is exemplified in Mullane and
Denckla. In Mullane the very legality of the "common trust fund"
principle depended on New York Law; both the legal status of the
trusts involved and whether the trustee has properly discharged his
legal responsibilities obviously must be governed exclusively by New
York law. It is only slightly less obvious that similarly, Delaware must
control the legal status of the trusts in Denckla. In both, such busi-
nesses have become subject both to extensive supervisory codes and to
major regulatory commissions. By any criterion that can be suggested,
measured by institutional standards, that law and it alone must govern
the substantive rights represented in the trusts where, as here, all the
component elements involved in these trusts and their administration
have a single location. There is no conceivably adequate reason for
placing any kind of legal power, legislative or judicial, over these
economic interests in a foreign state. The underlying policy considera-
tions supporting the admitted general competence of the domiciliary
121 Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1 K.B. 140
(1934).
122 Frankfurther v. W. L. Exner, Ltd., [1947] 1 Ch. 629.
123 The significant question is "Where is the seat" of the economic-socio-political
interests involved. Of course, this metaphorical use of the term "situs" at times may
result in its misuse, and in suggesting "wrong answers" to some. But this is true
in all cases of the "as if" use of established legal terminology-even though the
experience of centuries has demonstrated over and over that, because of language
limitations, this often is the only way that the law can grow, adapt and be kept
adequate, and effect transitions from a lower to a higher order.
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court, Florida, to serve as the "primary probate and administration
court," supplies no reasons whatever for such overreaching of that
forum. Justice Warren recognizes this fact clearly in his statement
quoted at note 81 supra.
Contrary to the vigorous assertions of influential writers in the
recent past, 25 these conclusions are not merely extensions of outworn,
anachronistic ideas based on false premises derived from the concept
of sovereignty. Though the elaboration of the thesis must be left for
another paper now in preparation as stated above, an overriding
critical issue facing the young nation in its formative years sprang
from the readiness of nearly every state to impinge outrageously on
the paramount governmental interests of every other state. And a
pressing question was how to avoid bitterness, strife, vindictiveness
and retaliatory action as a result thereof. The limitations imposed in
Pennoyer v. Neff"26 were rooted in the pragmatic experience of nearly
a century in dealing with the problem and generally expressed the
limitations that experience had demonstrated was the minimum needed
at that time, to ameliorate the conditions encouraging disunity.
27
Those limitations contributed very considerably to provide a viable,
dynamic political-legal environment for the harmonious development
of this federated nation. 2s
125 W. W. Cook pioneered the attack on the very conception of "legislative
jurisdiction," though some of his followers pursued it even more determinedly for a
time. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 70 (1942). Perhaps
his attempt to extirpate the phrase from conflicts doctrine was part of his larger
attack on "vested rights." But "legislative jurisdiction" is a conceptual tool that
is absolutely essential in any analysis of conflicts problems based on a "genuine
sociology of law" with an institutional treatment. So, happily, the principle not
only has withstood the attacks of its detractors; it is in a firmer position and its
value as an analytical tool is better appreciated today than ever. Witness the extended
development and refinement of the concept in the Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws Ch. 3, Jurisdiction in General (1956) and Ch. 7, Property (1959).
126 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
127 The legal history of that time, rightly read, supports some of Llewellyn's
acute observations in Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960).
It is believed that the development of the legal doctrine culminating in Pennoyer v.
Neff takes place almost entirely in the "grand style" of judicial craftsmanship, as he
describes it at 36, epitomizing the quotation which he translates from German author
Goldschmidt, at 122: "Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can
take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a
natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but
rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man
and of the life conditions of the time and place. . . .The highest task of law-giving
consists in uncovering and implementing this immanent law." Institutionally, these
are the "norms for the inner order." These judges were creative, not formalists.
128 In Story, Conflict of Laws (1834), the author simply provided a theoretical
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Logic of Institutional Treatment
Once the Supreme Court comes to realize more fully the futility
of elevating "uniformity of rule" on a national basis, either by means
of full faith and credit or otherwise, the more quickly will it become
clear that it can serve best in this area by being alert to those areas
in which there is a clearly paramount interest in some one state, and
framing relevant constitutional law doctrine so as to give full effect
to those paramount interests. It is submitted that it is only on that
approach that "genuine uniformity of treatment" can be achieved, with
its increase in interstate harmony. Professor Scott has almost precisely
this thesis in mind when he declares that:
It might be thought, and perhaps was thought by the Florida
court, that the Supreme Court . . . was unduly interfering with
the affairs of that state. This, indeed, seems to have been the
opinion of the dissenting Justices. On the other hand, if the Su-
preme Court had required the Delaware court to give full faith and
credit to the Florida judgment, it might well be thought, and un-
doubtedly would be thought by the Delaware court, that this would
be an undue interference with the affairs of that state. The Supreme
Court cannot escape this dilemma. In policing the distribution of
power among the states, it must take a position one way or the
other. I think that it is fortunate that the Supreme Court held that
it was Delaware and not Florida which had control over the disposi-
tion of the property, and held that, except so jar as the jurisdiction
of the Florida court might be based upon personal jurisdiction over
some of the beneficiaries, it had no power ta determine who should
ultimately receive the property. (Emphasis added.) 12 9
But even here, Professor Scott concedes too much to Florida.
I would deny Florida any competence to bind even the parties before
it on the issue of the legal status of the trusts. The "institutional
affiliation" here involved compels that conclusion. And a very recent
opinion by the Eighth Circuit 30 goes far in reaffirming our thesis.
That case stresses for all it is worth the importance of limiting the
doctrine of res judicata so as not to preclude F-2 from making an entirely
independent finding on the question of whether a certain tract of
land was located in Nebraska or in Missouri.' Institutionally there is
rationale for experience. He merely stated those premises already formulated by the
courts-which he himself had participated in-to provide the necessary institutional
environment for a healthy political relationship between the states, assuring us of
a viable economic growth in which all the potential tensions which otherwise would
result, are eliminated.
129 Scott, "Comment: Hanson v. Denckla," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 695, 708 (1959).
130 Duke v. Durfee, supra note 99. First suit not res judicata.
131 Id. at 220-1. Parties receive benefit of states' immunity to res judicata in
subsequent suit.
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quite as much reason for saying the same thing about the trust
estates in Delaware.
This is not to say that Delaware law must govern any and every
issue which may arise concerning the legal status of those trusts. On
other issues the institutional affiliations in other states may become
paramount. For example, though in Denckla it was reasonable for
the parties to grant that the "situs" of the trust res was in Delaware,
based specifically and particularly on the presence there of the stock
certificates forming the "corpus" of that trust,' Delaware law would
not be the appropriate one to determine conflicting rights in the
corporate investments represented by those shares. The institutional
affiliation of those corporations in the state of their incorporation
becomes the controlling one to determine ownership in the stock itself,
if that were put in issue. All of the parties involved are chargeable with
knowledge of the supremacy of "governmental interest" in the state
of incorporation strictly on the basis of institutional affiliation, for
exactly the same reasons which dictate that Delaware law control the
administration of the trust itself.
CONFLICT AVOIDANCE AGAIN
To this point, the law of Delaware has been chosen over that of
Florida to determine the legal status of the Donner trusts, largely on
the basis of the completeness with which it is affiliated with Delaware,
in recognition of the extent to which it is integrated into the economic-
legal system represented in that state. If there were other countervail-
ing considerations pointing to the selection of another law as a basis
for developing the most satisfactory "norm" for business purposes
(institutionally), they should not be ignored. There appear to be none.
However, such other considerations as the "reasonable expectations
of the parties" and/or "the intent and wishes of the settlor" all com-
bine to reinforce greatly the conclusions that Delaware law should
govern.
Considerable thought has been given in recent years to the general
problem of "conflict avoidance" (mentioned briefly above), i.e., of
tailoring and framing of transactions so as to avoid as much as possible
and to reduce to the minimum, potential choice of law problems.
Surely this should be encouraged by all legal systems generally. And
for the setting up of trusts in particular, a procedure whereby all the
elements of the trust are located in one state, and that a state most
132 Of course, the mere fact that the certificates were located in Delaware is not the
best reason for considering them "sitused" there. The real reason is that they formed
the corpus of a trust which was affiliated exclusively with Delaware.
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certainly hospitable to the trust and to the purposes which the settlor
wishes to be realized, offers the most promising procedure for such
"avoidance." At least in all those cases where the settlor's conduct is
generally consistent with that result, all reasonable efforts should be
made to effectuate that purpose. Everything in Denckla strongly sug-
gests that it was Mrs. Donner's intention, hope and understanding
that the trust was permanently affiliated with Delaware and its laws
-everything she did was consistent with such an understanding."'
The development of rules giving full effect to such purpose is the
only way to provide maximum "predictability" in a trust operation.
If this is so, the subsequent moving about of the settlor, whatever may
be his apparent intentions as to where he wants to live out his last
years (a strictly personal preference, often based on fickle and capri-
cious motivations), should be recognized as being so completely col-
lateral to and independent of the establishing and maintaining of large
trust estates of this kind as to have no connection with or effect upon
the institutional affiliation of that trust. Any other rule raises un-
necessary and arbitrary limitations on the freedom of movement of
the testator in relation to his trust purposes-they should be recog-
nized as involving two entirely different (institutional) worlds.
It would be hard to imagine a fact situation more dramatically
illustrating the validity of these observations. There is no doubt that
Donner wanted and expected her appointment to be valid and to
take effect inter vivos, and very probably she relied on Delaware law
for assurance. 34 A salutary principle of modern trust law, generally
recognized, at least formally, is that "The intention of the settlor
should be given effect so long as such intention is at all reasonable."
Yet, by making the "domicil at death" rule govern in this case, the
settlor's intention is completely defeated, and the appointment fails
with fairly obvious injustice as between the intended beneficiaries.
Restatement (Second) Support
As I read the relevant sections of the Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws,' they support completely the analysis just described.
Sections 294 through 299d stress the power of the settlor to select any
133 From the factual recital in Denckla, every act Mrs. Donner performed con-
nected with the trust, from its inception to her death, indicates strongly that she
expected it to continue to be treated strictly as a Delaware trust. Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 238-40 (1958).
134 Had Donner wanted her appointment to have a testamentary effect, it would
have been so simple to have dealt with it in her will, instead of using the much more
cumbersome device of executing a separate instrument.
135 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 293a-299d (1959).
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law "with a substantial connection with the trust" to govern both its
"validity" and its "administration"; subject, however, to an ex-
pressed recognition of the ultimate paramount power of the "situs" of
a "chattel or document" as part of the res to dictate that choice.
Inter vivos powers of appointment receive the same treatment.36
Under these sections, it should be possible to establish the "intention"
and wishes of the settlor by her conduct where it is clear, quite as
readily as by express statement in the trust instrument.
The Reese Analysis
On this analysis it is not at all easy to divine the reasons for
Professor Reese's expression of doubt, in a recent detailed analysis of
the case, that Denckla reached the "correct result" in refusing to give
conclusive effect to the Florida decision. He expresses that doubt
thus:
Yet, it is by no means clear that the majority in the Denckla
case arrived at the correct result. Personal jurisdiction could be
obtained in Florida over the great majority of the interested parties,
and this state would have afforded, in all probability, the most
convenient forum for the trial of the suit. Should not the rules
for obtaining judicial jurisdiction over an absent party be liberal-
ized somewhat in such a situation if, by this means, the forum could
determine the entire controversy and thus obviate the need for
multiple litigation? 137
These statements pose several questions. Professor Reese rests his
preference on an alleged "trial convenience" alone (the existence of
which is doubtful), without considering any of the countervailing
arguments relied on herein. Surely the trustees are much more than
mere nominal party stakeholders. At least arguably they have an
affirmative duty to appear in any court with power to render a
binding judgment on behalf of the settlor, to do everything they can
to save the trust for the purposes and wishes of the settlor. Further-
more, Reese states the issues solely in the interests of the individual
parties concerned. Justice Warren considers the interests of the
states concerned in "trust administration," as does Scott."3 " Speaking
as though the only issue here was whether it was reasonable for
Florida to litigate without the presence of the trustees, who Reese
apparently considers to be strictly only stakeholders, he adds:
136 Id. at §§ 294 and 295.
337 Reese & Galston, "Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of judicial
Jurisdiction," 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249, 257 (1959).
138 In the quotation just above, Reese and Galston seem to be giving effect
exclusively to procedural considerations and conveniences-the approval of a rule to
"avoid multiple litigation."
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This argument seems particularly persuasive in a case, such
as Denckla, where the absent party has no pecuniary or other
tangible interest in the outcome of the suit. He would suffer no
real harm if he did not appear at the trial at all. Hence considera-
tions of reasonableness would seem to indicate that his interest
in having the trial at a place convenient to him should be sub-
ordinated, at least to some extent, to the interests of those who have
more at stake.' 39
But what of the interests of those heirs who are relying on the
rights given them by the law of Delaware? So far as appears from
Reese's discussion, he is perfectly willing for Florida to ignore com-
pletely Delaware's law, to grossly violate the obvious wishes and
intentions of the settlor, and to destroy completely the rights created
by Delaware. "Why?," I would ask. The question is all the more
pressing in view of the fact that the Restatement (Second) recognizes
the paramount power in Delaware,140 which Florida so completely
ignores. Moreover, it is quite as convenient, for this trust at least, to
let the Delaware court adjudicate all rights of everybody concerned
in a single action as it is for Florida, notwithstanding Reese's contrary
assertion. Indeed, it appears from the record that more nearly all the
interested parties were represented in the Delaware action than in
the Florida suit.' The very least that might be required of Florida
would be that it do the best job it could of recognizing and giving
effect to Delaware's law as controlling-including its whole law.'42
Reese concludes on this point, with the observation that:
In any event, the close division of the Court in Hanson v.
Denckla reveals dramatically that uncertainties still abound in the
area of judicial jurisdiction based upon the doing of acts, and the
causing of consequences, in a state.
143
139 Reese & Galston, supra note 137, at 257-8.
140 Reese is the Reporter for the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, making
it especially difficult to divine the basis on which he so easily chooses Florida. Not
one of the criteria considered in the relevant sections of the Restatement suggest a
basis on which Florida might be chosen.
141 In Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 133, at 241, the court states: "About a
dozen other defendants were nonresidents. . . .With the exception of two individuals
whose interests coincided with complainants Denckla and Stewart, none of the non-
resident defendants made any appearance." This referred to the Florida suit. Contrast the
following statement, referring to the Delaware suit, id. at 242: "Nonresident defendants
were notified by registered mail. All of the trust companies, beneficiaries, and legatees
except Katherine N. R. Denckla, appeared and participated in the litigation."
142 Mistakenly and confusingly described as "renvoi" in the past, this practice
simply assumes that the forum has sufficient jurisdiction over the subject matter to
adjudicate, but must decide as would the Delaware court. It is not clear that either
Justice Warren or Scott would concede this much competence to the Florida court.
143 Reese & Galston, supra note 137, at 258.
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If we take his words at their face value, they strongly suggest
that Professor Reese makes exactly the same error as did both Leflar
and the judges discussed above, in assuming that "the doing of acts
and the causing of consequences in a state" should be equated in
exactly the same way in every case without regard to with what other
interests, having possibly exclusive institutional affiliations with other
states, they may be related to; i.e., regardless of whether such acts
and consequences should be deemed ancillary and subordinate to,
and thus controllingly related to, foreign institutional affiliations. If
so, this is a most unfortunate and harmful error.
CONTENTS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE STATUTE
The Denckla case convincingly demonstrates that the "doing of
an act" as a basis for enlarging "personal jurisdiction" cannot be
considered in a vacuum. The forum must consider its possible relation-
ship to foreign institutional affiliations. But this poses still another
question: Are the rules expanding the courts' power to exercise
personal jurisdiction limited to "acts or consequences"? The drafting of
some state codes indicates that the framers have thought that it might
be.' 44 But the fact is that the "comprehensive" codes we have been
comparing, quite generally already have formally enlarged such
jurisdiction on additional grounds. One need only recall that most of
the "broad" statutes make mere "ownership" a basis for substituted
service; 145 further, some acts also include the relationship of foreign
corporate officers to a local corporation, by subjecting such officer
to substituted service. 146 Obviously, therefore, the "enlarging" process
marches on. And presumably, all of these provisions are constitutional.
But this poses the still further question: Are there any limitations to
these enlargements?
Limitations on Broadening of Jurisdiction
Although, on casual consideration, the domestic relations field
may appear to be the least likely of all areas requiring limits on this
144 IlI. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956), states: "Any person ...
who . . . does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated . . . ." Such "act" thereunder
includes ". . . ownership . . . or possession of . . . real estate . . . ." Similarly drafted,
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-2702-2(B) (1961) enlarges "act" to include the positions,
offices, or statuses of corporate officer, executor or administrator. Apparently, the
drafters of these acts thought that "act" may have become a "magic word" for these
statutes, much as was the word "consent" became under the nonresident motorist
statutes.
145 Of course, the fact that such broadened jurisdiction need not be tied to "act"
is exemplified both in the Wisconsin legislation and in the Uniform Act.
146 Supra note 144, citing the Montana statute.
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broadening of "personal jurisdiction" since the courts often talk about
the rights and duties arising therefrom and suits based thereon being
quasi-in-rem in character, more careful examination of the various
questions arising in domestic relations litigation suggests definite
possible limitations on the power of a state to authorize its courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction by substituted service; that such power
is much narrower than its power to apply its own law; and that these
limitations may well survive the foreseeable future. 14 7
Domestic Relations Issues
Suppose, for example, a state determines to authorize its courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction by foreign process in all consti-
tutionally permissible cases arising in the domestic relations field.
Typically, these will include suits for divorce or annulment, for
support, for alimony, and for child custody. Can it do so for any or
all of these suits? For a court with jurisdiction otherwise to grant a
divorce or an annulment, jurisdiction over the defendant poses no
problem because such personal jurisdiction has never been required.
For support or alimony proceedings, however, courts generally have
doubted that they possessed the competence to exercise jurisdiction
over these "subject matters" without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.4 " Legislators generally have also doubted that they could
constitutionally empower their courts to exercise such jurisdiction by
substituted service, as is dramatically demonstrated by the history of
the very recent "Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act." That
Uniform Act, throughout its various revisions from 1950 to 1958, has
assumed that a condition to any binding finding of duty of support
against a defendant, generally, is that the forum acquire a strictly
personal jurisdiction over him on compulsive personal service.' 9 The
Act is carefully drafted to that end, illustrated by resort to the "two
court" proceeding under it, with the second cofirt acquiring personal
jurisdiction' 50 which is required at least as much by the presumed
147 Leflar's suggestion that "choice of law" and "judicial jurisdiction" may be
merging very possibly is made in the limiting framework of "acts." Though causes of
actions arising out of domestic relations traditionally are "localized," this generally
does not appear to be an influencing factor in the Supreme Court's decisions broadening
the constitutional restrictions on the exercise of that jurisdiction, rather than narrowing
them as in other fields. Rather are they due process limitations related to and in the
light of the particular subject matter.
148 Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1950); Spradling v. Spradling, 74
Okla. 276, 181 Pac. 599 (1919). Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
149 Tennessee v. Perry, 198 Tenn. 389, 2S0 S.v.2d 919 (1955).
150 Briggs, "The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," 15 Mont. L. Rev. 40,
49-56 (1954); Briggs, "Need for Adoption of the 1958 Amendments to the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," 20 Mont. L. Rev. 40, 49 (1958).
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necessity of a "compulsive" type of service as by the practical re-
quirement that the defendant be subjected to the "contempt powers" of
a court to insure payment-indeed, "compulsive service" serves a
double purpose which, in combination, greatly strengthens the Act's
effectiveness.
Support and Custody
Furthermore, in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 5' conclusively reinforced
by Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,152 the United States Supreme Court recently
has fully confirmed these common-law doubts, ruling that a state legisla-
ture cannot empower its courts either to decree alimony in favor of the
wife or rule against her right to support, merely on substituted service. 53
In the latter case particularly, Justice Black states this constitutional
prohibition broadly so as to prohibit the divorcing court from attempt-
ing either to cut off the right of an absent spouse to support, or to
adjudicate the existence and quantum of an absent husband's duty
to pay alimony, in the following language:
Here, the Nevada divorce court was as powerless to cut off the
wife's support right as it would have been to order the husband to
pay alimony if the wife had brought the divorce action and he had
not been subject to the divorce court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife's
right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not obligate New York to give it recognition.154
This principle clearly should control equally all forms of support
litigation.'55 And note that the principal dissenters in Denckla are
the strongest advocates for limiting "personal jurisdiction" in domestic
relations.'5
151 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
152 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
153 Of course, presence or absence of "purposeful act" is irrelevant.
154 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 152, at 418-9. Though Warren did not
participate in this decision, he had concurred in Armstrong v. Armstrong on the ground
relied on by the majority in this case; hence, practically, the Vanderbilt decision
was supported by a seven-to-two majority.
155 See California v. Copus, 138 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227 (1958), which ruled that
California could subject the defendant to a continuing duty to support his mother in
a California institution, only so long as he was a resident thereof. However, the
limitation on liability imposed by this case may be legislative, rather than constitutional.
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 7 (1952) assumes that either
of the two co-operating states may impose the duty wherever the obligee is found.
But even that Act does not attempt to subject the defendant either to the legislative or
the judicial jurisdiction of a state in which he has never been "present."
156 Both Black and Douglas, dissenting in Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 133,
strongly approved restricting judicial jurisdiction in Armstrong and Vanderbilt; they
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Note that here the private interests of the spouse and the public
interests of the foreign state in the welfare of that spouse, are equally
protected by the instrumentality of "due process." Hence, we see
here an increasing awareness of the need for extending continuous
solid recognition of and protection for paramount governmental
interests in certain socio-legal institutions affiliated in a particular
nonforum state.
15 7
Of course, it may be objected that all of this is changed by the
"demise" of Pennoyer v. Neff. That such is not the case, however, is
conclusively established both by Armstrong v. Armstrong,' trench-
antly confirmed in Vanderbilt,"9 and by Justice Warren's explicit
extension of the limitations of these cases to the administration of
a trust in Denckla, when he declares:
Those restrictions [on substituted service] are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of
the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in
a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are
a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.160
But more significantly yet, as recently as 1953, the United States
Supreme Court introduced and stressed an opposite, narrowing trend,
exemplified in custody cases, denying for the first time the power of
state courts to exercise jurisdiction to entertain an action for the
custody of a child by substituted service on the defendant parent. In
fact, May v. Anderson 6' flatly denied any power in even the court
of the matrimonial domicil, where the children were still domiciled
also concurred in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), requiring personal service on
the contesting parent in a custody case for the first time.
157 Such development supports the thesis advanced that an exclusive legislative
jurisdiction should be recognized in numerous fields; further, where recognized,
references to that law should be to its whole law-but that this should never be
confused with the supposed "renvoi problem." See Briggs, "The Need for the 'Legislative
Jurisdictional Principle' in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws," 39 Minn. L. Rev.
517 (1955), and related articles. Note further that these "domestic relations" cases
suggest the antithesis of Leflar's "merger trend."
158 Supra note 151.
18 Supra note 152.
160 Hanson v. Denkcla, supra note 133, at 251. Obviously, "convenient forum" alone,
particularly for the plaintiff, is not enough. And, though taken literally, this quotation
might suggest that the only thing lacking in Denckla, is the necessary "minimum
contact'." Such is not the case.
101 Supra note 156. In such a case, the wife had had the most extensive and
intensive "contacts" with the forum, the matrimonial domicil, and the continuing domicil
of the husband and children.
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
with their father, to make an award in favor of the father, in Wis-
consin, even though the mother was personally served in Ohio," 2
where she then resided. It held such decree not entitled to full faith
and credit in Ohio, and arguably, that it was void even in the forum
for lack of due process. 6 '
Arguably,'64 at least, there is a less substantial institutional basis
for denying this power than for denying it in support and alimony
actions, and one might expect the Supreme Court to modify this new
restriction in the light of McGee's very liberal rule, four years later,
for "single acts"; but this reasoning ignores the insights provided
by the present analysis revealing that McGee just regulates different
"institutions." In any case, though Frankfurter dissented in the seven-
to-two decision in Vanderbilt, also decided in 1957, he was careful to
reaffirm his approval of May v. Anderson's requirement of actual
compulsive service on the defendant parent in a custody case, going
out of his way to distinguish it in a footnote, in the following lan-
guage:
Custody over children presents an entirely different problem.
See May v. Anderson. . . .The interests of independent human
beings, the children, are involved. Also, insofar as the spouses'
interests are concerned, the divorce may terminate their relations
with each other as husband and wife, but it cannot terminate their
relation to their children.' 65
At the same time, there is no doubt in all of these cases that the
forum properly applies its own substantive law in adjudicating the
issues involved. That conclusion is of the utmost importance in eval-
uating Professor Leflar's suggestion that "choice of law" and "judicial
jurisdiction" are merging. This considerable body of decisions argu-
ably supports the opposite hypothesis. So, in the light of the very
substantial and even "expanding" restrictions imposed by the Supreme
Court on all of these domestic relations issues, at least for the moment,
there seems to be little prospect of that Court "completing the merger
162 Id. at 530. Justice Burton states: "The only service of process upon appellant
consisted of the delivery to her personally, in Ohio, of a copy of the Wisconsin
summons and petition."
163 Justice Jackson, dissenting, seemed to think that the majority was based on a
lack of due process, but Justice Frankfurter maintained that the decision went only
to the full faith and credit issue. Justice Burton's opinion was not clear on the point.
164 Such argument would insist that the most that should be required would be
actual notice, assuring opportunity to contest. Modification of Anderson to accept this
rule in the next few years is quite conceivable. But even that would support a
restrictive trend rather than an expanding one.
165 May v. Anderson, supra note 156, at 423 n.1.
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of the constitutional limitations of choice of law generally, with the
rules limiting substituted service," as envisioned by Leflar.' 66
BROADENING OF NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
But this is not the whole story yet! The extent and direction of
the Supreme Court's actions in modifying traditional doctrine regu-
lating judicial jurisdiction cannot be correctly perceived until its
various decisions imposing a much greater duty to give actual notice
in all kinds of litigation is taken into account, and correlated with the
so-called "liberalizing" rules of International Shoe and McGee. In
actions in rem in nature, we find a broad-gauged "tightening up" of
the requirements of due process, restricting very considerably the
plenary power which states have had therein historically-thus further
continuing a trend opposite to the "single act" cases. Both opposing
tendencies involve a realistic tailoring and fashioning of a framework
of "norms for the judicial process" (inner institutional order) ,"7
restricting arbitrary judicial power on the one hand, and liberalizing
"judicial power" on the other, where it is now thought reasonable,
on balance.
As late as 1870, in Cooper v. Reynolds, 6 " the Supreme Court
upheld the Tennessee court in cutting off all rights in local land on a
record leaving it very unclear whether any kind of "notice"-even by
publication-actually was ever given. This tolerates plenary power
run rampant, going entirely beyond any legitimate institutional interest
in Tennessee. In a series of more modern cases, however, the Supreme
Court has progressively subjected in rem actions, as well as personal
actions, to the requirement of actual notice. So the instances in
which "publication" is constitutionally permissible are now much
fewer than formerly. 6 9 Also, it now requires a reasonable time for
160 Leflar may not have had "domestic relations" cases in mind in stating his
"merging trend." However, he does cite a number of such fields as a basis for his
discussion, and he does not formally distinguish "localized actions" in his thesis.
167 The entire body of "true" procedural rules reasonably may be characterized as
the "norms for the inner order" of the "judicial [adjudicative] process," considered
institutionally. They are formulated with one purpose in mind, i.e., the most efficient
functioning of that process to guarantee the achieving of its ends, as a distinctive
self-contained governmental institution.
168 77 U.S. 308 (1870).
169 Schroeder v. City of New York, - U.S.- , 9 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1962).
Here a notice by publication statute, in a condemnation proceeding, providing for
posting of notice conspicuously in several places in the area of the proposed con-
demnation, almost certainly constitutional historically, was held violative of due
process.
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the defendant to respond, even when publication is allowed; 170 and
in Mullane,171 it laid down the broad dictum that, in every judicial
proceeding in rem or in personam, both due process and full faith
and credit require that that form of available notice be given which
is most likely to inform in fact. And in a slight variation in the appli-
cation of the same principle, it has gone even further in requiring that,
even when the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it
must act on the same standards for assuring notice in fact regarding
any further proceedings in the suit.1 72
All of these developments contribute greatly to a creative system
of rules having as their purpose the achieving of the most fundamental
purposes of a viable judicial process operating institutionally, i.e.,
the determination of all those facts on which the most "just decision"
becomes possible.
BASES FOR "UNIFORITY"
On this "whole view" perspective, the following thesis is fully
supportable: We see here that, in the last several decades, in framing
constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial (and we might add,
"legislative") jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has consistently given
effect-sometimes gropingly, sometimes consciously and partly artic-
ulated, at other times instinctively-to the principle that under that
constitution, an overriding purpose in conflicts cases generally is the
"allocating and distributing of sovereign power1173 among the states-
and between the states collectively, and the federal sovereign-as
was so neatly stated by Scott in justifying his preference of Delaware
law over Florida's in Denckla,7 4 by justice Warren, 17' and even by
Jackson, in his dissent in May v. Anderson:
I am quite aware that in recent times this Court has been
chipping away at the concept of domicile as a connecting factor
between the state and the individual to determine rights and
obligations .... But if our federal system is to maintain separate
legal communities, as the Full Faith and Credit Clause evidently
contemplates, there must be some test for determining to which
of these a person belongs [i.e., for the purpose of allocating and
170 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
171 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-320 (1950).
The court did not require actual personal notice in every case-a large common class
was involved.
172 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
173 It should not be necessary to stress the fact that "sovereign power" represents
the total institutional power of each society.
174 See note 129 supra.
175 Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at note 133, at 247-9.
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distributing power]. If, for this purpose, there is a better concept
than domicile, we have not yet hit upon it.
17 6
Further, the Court seems to be becoming more and more aware
of the fact that the only realizable ideal of "uniformity" of any kind
lies in the direction of developing criteria for making such allocation
and distribution so far as possible, rather than in a mechanical
application of full faith and credit, or in the application of any other
over-simplified cliche. Moreover, a basic canon of this thesis is recog-
nition of the fact that the judicial process cannot be treated institu-
tionally as operating separately and independently from the political-
legal system of which it is a party.
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Though it has been typical of recent analyses of conflicts cases
to assume that, generally the interests of several different states are
substantial enough and are sufficiently in "balance" to equally justify
the selection of its own law by any one of them, it is submitted that a
general "institutional analysis" will make clear that such assumption
is not correct nearly so commonly as is assumed. Just how serious
this error is can be established only by further analysis of the same
kind.171
176 May v. Anderson, supra note 156, at 538-9.
177 Of course, courts have very important "legislative" functions, but these must
be made subordinate and a supplementary part of legal administration; however, those
powers are broadest on conflicts issues, generally. The tortured view that courts are
free floating agents with independent competence to create rights has been given
plausibility in the past only by an overstressing of the proposition that there is no right
without a remedy and of the transitory character in modern law of the remedy most
commonly involved in litigation.
178 Cf. Currie, "Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws," 8
Duke L.J. 171 (1959); Ehrenzweig, "The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of
Laws," 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960).
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